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Background Checks and Social Effects:
Contemporary Residential Tenant-Screening
Problems in Washington State
Eric Dunn & Marina Grabchuk
INTRODUCTION
In October 2007, the website FreeCreditReport.com—not to be confused
with the publicly mandated annualcreditreport.com1—launched a series of
television commercials featuring a young singer who laments having
neglected to watch over his credit report. He is turned down for jobs, loans,
and in one spot, housing:
Well I married my dream girl, I married my dream girl
But she didn’t tell me her credit was bad
So now instead of living in a pleasant suburb
We’re living in the basement at her mom and dad’s
Now we can’t get a loan for a respectable home
Just because my girl defaulted on some old credit card
If we’d gone to free credit report dot com
I’d be a happy bachelor with a dog and a yard.2
Some might agree with the singer—that he should have run his fiancée’s
credit report before saying “I do.” Others might find the thought revolting.
But there is no denying the jingle’s underlying premise: poor credit
absolutely can doom a young couple’s dreams of moving into their own
home. And though most families who cannot qualify for a home loan would
probably sooner rent an apartment than live in their parents’ basement,
unfavorable credit reports are no less a barrier to obtaining rental housing.
Indeed, those seeking housing in today’s rental market find it, in some
ways, even more difficult than qualifying for a mortgage. Loan applications
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are approved or denied almost exclusively on the basis of financial criteria.
Rental applicants, however, must usually also satisfy a series of inquiries
into matters of character, lifestyle, and personal history. This has long been
the case, but modern information systems have vastly expanded the amount
of information available to landlords about prospective tenants and the
warped speeds at which that information can be obtained,. In today’s age of
online public records and digital transmission, a rental applicant’s complete
residential history, credit report, criminal record, civil litigation
background, and other information are available within hours or even
minutes, and in Washington, all at the prospective tenant’s expense.3 Some
landlords access this information directly from public websites and
databases; however, most contract with tenant-screening services (a subset
of the consumer-reporting industry) to cull records from various sources
and prepare custom “tenant-screening reports.”
These technologies have revolutionized the processes by which rental
housing providers choose tenants, supplementing or even replacing
traditional tenant-screening tools like written applications, personal
interviews, or phone calls to past landlords. Today’s residential landlords
are able to choose their tenants much more selectively than in the past, and
do so in hopes of reducing the risk of leasing to a tenant who will default in
rent, damage the premises, or be otherwise problematic. As is common with
technological advances, however, these benefits have come at significant,
though largely overlooked, social costs.
In Washington, individuals and families are frequently denied housing
due to inaccurate or misleading background reports that they have no
practical way of correcting.4 Other potential tenants are deterred by or
unable to afford screening fees, which, if they pay and are rejected at one
property, they must pay again to apply elsewhere.5 Still others find they are
simply unable to rent at all; they are disqualified from the rental market
almost entirely due to past eviction lawsuits, criminal prosecutions,
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domestic violence protection order cases, poor consumer credit, or other
disfavored characteristics.6
In Washington, unfavorable tenant-screening reports probably do not
deter too many marriages among perfectly matched mates, but they do keep
plenty of people living in their parents’ basements. Contemporary tenantscreening practices (and the exclusionary policies they support) also swell
the ranks of the homeless,7 frustrate offender reentry programs, deter
domestic violence survivors from leaving abusive partners, chill existing
tenants from asserting basic legal rights, and cause other significant public
policy effects Washington can scarcely afford to ignore.
This article will take a deeper look at these problems, how they arose,
and possible methods to address them. Part One looks at current residential
screening industry practices, including common tenant-selection criteria,
and the procedures and information sources that landlords use to evaluate
applicants. Part Two will detail how these practices lead to social problems,
such as unfair rejections for rental housing or the collective effects of
disqualifying people categorically from broad sections of the rental market
due to criminal records, eviction cases, or poor credit. Part Three examines
the limited strengths and numerous drawbacks to the few potential legal
remedies for frustrated rental applicants under existing U.S. and
Washington law, including theories under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
Washington’s Residential-Landlord Tenant Act and Consumer Protection
Act, fair housing statutes, and privacy claims. Finally, Part Four discusses
possible legislative solutions that, if enacted, could mitigate abusive tenantscreening practices in Washington, such as proposals for “portable
screening reports,” enhanced procedures for sealing judicial records, and
expanded protection for tenants under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

I. CURRENT INDUSTRY NORMS
Tenant-screening policies typically entail two components: a set of
criteria for accepting tenants and a method for determining whether a
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particular applicant meets those criteria. Both aspects profoundly affect how
rental housing opportunities are distributed in Washington.
A. Tenant-Selection Criteria
The purpose of tenant screening is to predict the likelihood that a
particular rental applicant will make (what the landlord considers) a “good
tenant.” To this end, the criteria landlords use for selecting tenants can
range from amorphous judgments about an applicant’s desirability to formal
admission policies that evaluate applicants across a wide spectrum of
factors. But most of the time, rental criteria relate to the essential
requirements of residential tenancies like paying rent and complying with
basic rules. Despite variations from one housing provider to the next, basic
criteria usually fall along the twin axes of financial suitability and
behavioral suitability.8
Financial suitability means being able to meet the anticipated pecuniary
obligations of the tenancy.9 This most obviously includes rent, as well as
other expected expenses such as utility bills, security deposits, renter’s
insurance (if required), and so on. Some landlords may also consider
whether the applicant would be likely to pay a claim or judgment in the
event of damage to the premises, early lease termination, or other breach.10
Many housing providers assess financial suitability using mathematical
formulas or thresholds (e.g., monthly gross income of two-and-a-half to
three times the rent is common).11 An applicant may also need to
demonstrate that the income is reliable, such as through a minimum
duration of employment.12 Some landlords may require a cosigner or extra
security deposit for applicants whose financial qualifications are
marginal.13 Notably, many housing providers refuse to accept tenants who
rely on child support, government housing subsidies, welfare benefits, or
certain other often-stigmatized income sources.14 Even assuming the tenant
has the financial resources to afford the rent and other bills, a history of late
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payments, debts—especially to former landlords—or other adverse credit
history can disqualify a rental applicant.15
Behavioral suitability means satisfying the housing provider that the
applicant will follow the rules, fulfill other nonfinancial obligations of the
tenancy, and live harmoniously in the community.16 This determination is
typically based on an applicant’s history at previous residences, as shown
by interviews with the applicant, with prior landlords and other references,
and, especially, with various background reports such as civil litigation
records, criminal histories, and credit scores. Applicants who receive critical
reports from past housing providers or who cannot demonstrate a stable
residential history are generally treated less favorably.17 Applicants with
acute blemishes such as bankruptcies, foreclosures, eviction records, or
felony convictions are often categorically excluded.18
B. Screening Methods and Information Sources
Today’s landlords commonly obtain the reports that facilitate the use of
both financial and behavioral tenant-selection criteria from backgroundcheck providers,19 many of whom specialize in so-called “tenant screening”
and others who also conduct pre-employment screening and other types of
consumer reports.20 Tenant-screening companies can provide residential
landlords almost-instant access to extensive background information about
practically any rental applicant. Tenant-screening reports, which typically
cost between $35 and $75 per adult occupant21—with the entire cost
generally passed along to the applicant22—commonly include four main
components concerning an applicant: (1) a residential history; (2) a credit
report; (3) a criminal background check; and (4) civil litigation records
(especially eviction reports).23 In addition, many tenant-screening services
also market analysis or evaluation of this raw information, usually in the
form of “scores” or “recommendations” concerning the applicant’s fitness
for tenancy.24 The methods and practices by which this information is
compiled, expressed, transmitted, analyzed, verified, and ultimately used
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present new challenges for contemporary consumer advocates as well as the
judicial system itself. We begin with a closer look at the reports.
1. Residential History
Housing providers routinely require applicants to disclose their prior
residences for the preceding period, often about three to seven years into the
past, usually on a written rental application. This residential history
provides names and contact information for past housing providers, and
indicates the proper states and localities to search for criminal records, civil
litigation records, or other public records. Most housing providers and
screening services will cross-check past addresses that an applicant supplies
against a credit report or other external sources. The failure to fully and
accurately disclose past housing providers or places of residence may alone
be sufficient grounds for rejection.25 Some screening services, usually for
higher fees, will interview past housing providers and include the resulting
information in the screening report,26 whether verbatim, in a summary or
abbreviated form, or by incorporation into a recommendation or other
evaluation of the applicant’s desirability.
2. Credit Reports
Another regular feature of a tenant-screening report is a credit report, that
is, a “consumer report,”27 about the applicant from a credit bureau, often
(but not always) from one of the so-called “big three” credit bureaus:28
Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union.29 Although “credit bureau” has no
official meaning in U.S. law,30 the term is popularly understood to mean “a
company that collects information from various sources and provides
consumer credit information on individual consumers for a variety of
uses.”31 A credit report will generally list an applicant’s prior addresses,
consumer accounts and the status of each account, bankruptcies,
foreclosures, civil judgments, and records of other financial obligations
(such as support orders, criminal fines, restitution orders, etc.).32 The credit
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report should also identify anyone who has requested the report and the
purpose of such inquiries.33
3. Criminal Background Checks
A criminal background check is a consumer report containing
information related to arrests, criminal charges, or convictions pertaining to
the applicant.34 Some screening services search for criminal records only in
local jurisdictions; others search across the country for records or in any
jurisdiction where the applicant has reported living.35 Though there is no
nationwide database or other central repository of criminal records, some
tenant-screening companies offer a fifty-state search for criminal records,
which may include jurisdictions where the applicant has never lived or even
visited.36
In Washington, criminal records are available through the WATCH
(Washington Access To Criminal History) database, which is maintained by
the Washington State Patrol.37 WATCH contains records produced by
courts and criminal justice agencies throughout the state and include
conviction records, records of arrests within one year if pending disposition,
and records of registered sex offenders and kidnappers.38 WATCH matches
records to the name, date of birth, or other identifiers used in the search
inquiry.39 Any member of the public can access WATCH online and obtain
an immediate criminal record for a $10 fee per search.40
Like with credit reports, some tenant screeners—particularly those that
market nationwide criminal-history reports—purchase private criminalbackground reports for resale as part of the tenant-screening package.41
Hundreds of private vendors assemble and resell criminal records as part of
background checks for pre-employment and tenant screening.42 The largest
providers include USIS Commercial Services, which has over thirty
thousand clients and performs more than four million reports per year, and
Choice Point, which conducts over three million background checks per
year and claims to perform criminal screening for half of America’s largest
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companies.43 Many private vendors maintain their own “shadow databases,”
which may contain criminal records that have been expunged or vacated, or
otherwise restricted or sealed to public access.44
4. Civil Litigation Records
Tenant-screening reports also usually contain records concerning various
forms of civil litigation, most of which are obtained directly from courts or
court-maintained indices.45 Money judgments usually appear on credit
reports, such as in collections cases for consumer or medical debt.46 Judicial
foreclosure actions are rare in Washington, but may also appear in screening
reports.47 Other civil litigation records common in tenant-screening reports
include rental collections,48 tenant-initiated landlord-tenant suits,49
antiharassment or domestic violence protection order proceedings,50 and
civil commitment proceedings.51
Most important are unlawful detainer (i.e., eviction) lawsuits52 which
tenant-screening firms report when the applicant is named as a defendant. In
Washington, unlawful detainer cases are heard in county-level superior
courts.53 Civil case records for superior courts, including unlawful detainer
actions (UDs) are indexed in the Superior Court Management Information
System (SCOMIS), a statewide electronic case management database.54
SCOMIS data is free and instantly accessible by anyone via internet.55
Whenever a new civil action is filed in any of Washington’s thirty-nine
superior courts, the clerk enters the parties’ names, case number, and “case
type” into SCOMIS; for an eviction lawsuit, the case type will appear as
“unlawful detainer.” In addition to the public site, the Washington
Administrative Office of the Courts provides a subscription service whereby
subscribers may periodically download SCOMIS data into private computer
systems.56
Landlords and tenant-screening services can find out whether a
prospective tenant has ever been sued for unlawful detainer in Washington
by running a name search in SCOMIS (or a private database containing
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information downloaded from SCOMIS). A person who has such a record is
deemed by the tenant-screening industry to have an “eviction history.”57
Detecting an eviction history may be fast and free to anyone with internet
access, but more detailed and trustworthy information about civil actions is
comparatively difficult, expensive, and time-consuming to obtain. SCOMIS
does allow access to cryptic docket entries in pending or recently closed
cases, but it does not include or link to any additional records or documents
containing the claims, defenses, findings, evidence, or other details about
cases being searched.58 Some superior courts, such as King County’s, make
scanned case documents available on-line—but for a fee, and access
requires a special account.59 Few housing providers choose to incur such
expenses and delays to obtain more detailed records.

II. CURRENT PROBLEMS IN TENANT-SCREENING
Contemporary tenant-screening practices raise two types of problems for
residential tenants in Washington. First, tenant-screening reports that
contain inaccurate or misleading information impair many tenants’ housing
prospects undeservedly. Second, exclusionary policies deprive many
individuals and families of access to housing for reasons that, while based
on true information, are objectively unfair or conflict with other significant
public policy goals.
A. Inaccurate or Misleading Information in Tenant-Screening Reports
Studies assessing the accuracy of consumer reports show alarming rates
of factual errors. A 2004 study based on 197 interviews across thirty U.S.
states found errors in 79 percent of respondents’ “big three” consumer
reports.60 One in four of those errors were significant enough to cause a
consumer’s wrongful denial of credit.61 An ABC News investigation in
2008 uncovered “dozens of lawsuits, on behalf of hundreds of people, filed
in the last two years against the major criminal records database companies,
alleging that background checks contain inaccurate information about
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criminal convictions.”62 Public records databases can be compromised by
similar errors. For instance, state sex offender registries, which often rely on
offenders to update their own listings, are notorious for reporting outdated
or inaccurate information.63
Tenant-screening reports typically incorporate several components into a
single report.64 This suggests that the chance of finding significant errors in
a tenant-screening report is at least as high as the combined likelihood of
finding errors in each particular component,65 and additional opportunities
for clerical errors and other mistakes tend to arise any time a screening
agency interprets, repackages, abridges, or otherwise modifies information
in a component part. This is especially true of scores or recommendations
based on criminal and civil litigation records, which may require substantial
skill to properly interpret.66
Types of errors common in background checks include overreporting
(i.e.., when a record about a different person with the same name as the
applicant is reported as being a potential match for the applicant),67 records
based on criminal identity theft (i.e., where an actual arrestee gives a false
name or claims to be another actual person), reports containing expunged
records, and mundane clerical errors.68 Washington’s public records
systems are susceptible to all of these problems.
WATCH reports records based on replicable identifiers such as names
and birth dates, which can lead to a high incidence of potential matches and,
thus, overreporting of criminal records.69 The possibility for potential
matches is even higher with SCOMIS, which narrows name searches only
by county.70 Inevitable clerical errors occur, whether by court clerks, law
enforcement personnel, or others inputting information or making changes
in the database.71 Safeguards against identity theft—criminal or otherwise—
do not exist. For these reasons, WATCH warns users that it “cannot
guarantee the records you obtain through this site relate to the person on
whom you are seeking information,”72 while SCOMIS makes “no
representations regarding the identity of any person whose name appears on
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these pages,” and warns that data may not be “accurate or complete [or] in
its most current form.”73
A related problem is the presentation of true information in misleading
ways, resulting in harm to prospective tenants. For instance, criminal
history reports often make “several criminal charges connected with one
arrest look like they involve multiple incidents.”74 A report showing that a
rental applicant was sued for unlawful detainer often creates an impression
that the person was evicted, even though she may have been improperly
sued or prevailed in the case.75 In fact, eviction reports seldom contain more
than the most basic information about unlawful detainer suits: the names of
the parties, the court where the action was filed, and a filing date.76 Further
details—such as the grounds for suit, any defenses raised, or the outcome—
are typically omitted or, if included at all, reported in a perfunctory,
incomplete, or even incoherent manner.
Figure 1 shows an eviction report prepared by On-Site Manager, Inc., a
major tenant-screening company active in Washington. This report exceeds
the norm in that it gives the address of the property and the name and
telephone number of the plaintiff’s attorney. But the report does not state
the outcome or present status of the case, nor does it indicate whether the
property was a residence, commercial property, or other type of tenancy.
The grounds for suit are not stated, and the cryptic abbreviation “2NV”
(under “Notice Type”) is nowhere else defined. The report makes no
mention of any defenses raised or of any findings or adjudications by the
court. Perhaps most importantly, all the information appears on a grid
labeled “Evictions.”
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Figure 1: “Eviction” report from On-Site Manager, Inc.
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Erroneously attributed criminal records or eviction cases can obviously
cause applicants to be denied housing, for such records make applicants
appear as less desirable tenants than they truly are. Inaccurate or misleading
screening reports also cause applicants to be rejected for nondisclosure or
misrepresentation, as housing providers almost always ask potential tenants
to disclose any criminal convictions or eviction suits on their applications,
and false or incomplete information is usually an independent basis for
rejection.77 Despite the serious consequences of such errors and misleading
information, correcting inaccurate tenant-screening reports is seldom
practical or beneficial to rental applicants.
B. Monitoring or Correcting Inaccurate Tenant-Screening Reports
Both the federal and Washington Fair Credit Reporting Acts provide
dispute and reinvestigation mechanisms that enable consumers to rectify
inaccurate or misleading credit records.78 These statutory procedures
obligate a consumer reporting agency79 (“CRA”) that receives a dispute
concerning the accuracy or completeness of information on a “consumer
report” to “reinvestigate” the item, at no charge to the consumer, within
thirty days.80 Unless the CRA verifies the disputed entry, the information
must be “promptly delete[d] from the file of the consumer, or modif[ied] as
appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation.”81 If reinvestigation
does not resolve the dispute, the CRA must permit the consumer to file a
“brief statement setting forth the nature of the dispute” along with the
adverse item.82
Albeit imperfect, this process at least enables consumers who anticipate
applying for credit to take proactive steps that can prevent them from being
turned down or charged higher rates due to inaccurate information. But a
vital component in this scheme is an automated updating system, “e-Oscar”
(for Online Solution for Complete and Accurate Reporting),83 through
which the results of any reinvestigation and correction by one national
credit bureau are automatically transmitted to other national credit bureaus
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on a periodic basis.84 Because of e-Oscar, a consumer only needs to dispute
an item with one national credit bureau to correct the same information with
all of them.85
In stark contrast, rental applicants have no practical method to check their
tenant-screening reports or to dispute inaccurate or misleading information
in advance of a housing search. Only CRAs that “regularly engage in the
practice of assembling or evaluating, and maintaining . . . [c]redit account
information from persons who furnish that information regularly and in the
ordinary course of business” are required to participate in e-Oscar or a
comparable automated reinvestigation or updating service.86 Tenantscreening agencies tend to avoid this requirement because they do not
ordinarily receive regular credit account updates from banks, credit card
companies, or other “furnishers.”87 Because there are dozens of tenantscreening services operating in Washington,88 obtaining and reviewing
tenant-screening reports from so many companies, as well as disputing any
inaccuracies found in the reports, is not feasible.89
Also, unlike the big three and other CRAs that maintain running files on
all consumers, a tenant-screening firm customarily compiles a report on a
specific rental applicant only when requested by a housing provider.90 Upon
transmitting that report to a landlord, the screening service ordinarily will
not continue to collect or update information about that applicant, and may
even delete the file altogether.91 When a screening company has no report to
obtain and review ahead of time,92 it is nearly impossible for a consumer to
preemptively assure his report is accurate, even if he knows which
screening service the prospective landlord will use.
Housing providers typically order tenant-screening reports only upon
receiving rental applications for then-available dwelling units and usually
make prompt use of such reports.93 If a report contributes to an applicant’s
rejection, the landlord must so inform the applicant and provide the name,
address, and telephone number of the screening service that supplied it.94
The applicant may then obtain a free copy of that report (from the screening

RESIDENTIAL TENANT-SCREENING

Background Checks and Social Effects 333

firm) within the next sixty days, which the consumer may use to detect and
dispute any inaccuracies that may have led to the denial.95 But submitting
such a dispute is seldom worthwhile.
Disputing an inaccurate or misleading tenant-screening report after a
denial is often futile because the desired rental unit will likely be leased to
another person well before a rejected applicant can obtain the report, lodge
a dispute, wait up to thirty days for the reinvestigation, and (if successful)
secure a corrected report, which may or may not cause the housing provider
to reconsider the application.96 Because there are so many tenant-screening
firms operating in Washington, the next housing provider to whom the
applicant applies is unlikely to request a screening report from the same
source.97 Furthermore, if the disputed information is derived from an
erroneous or misleading public record, the CRA may not even owe a duty to
correct its report unless (and until) the public record itself is corrected.98
C. Multiple Screening Fees for the Same Information
Another problem associated with incorrect records is multiple screening
fees. A person who applies for housing at successive providers must
ordinarily pay a separate screening fee each time, even though the reports
purchased with those fees usually contain substantially identical
information.99 Applicants with blemished credit or adverse background
information often face a substantial risk of rental rejections and the
associated prospect of paying multiple screening fees any time they search
for rental housing.100 For these individuals, screening fees can easily extend
into the hundreds of dollars,101 sometimes consuming funds that might be
needed for security deposits, moving expenses, or other housing-related
costs.102 Social service agencies that offer financial assistance with such
expenses are similarly affected.103
Landlords have little incentive to limit screening costs. Though
Washington prohibits landlords from earning profits on tenant-screening
charges, landlords can, and almost always do, pass the entire cost of
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screening reports on to applicants.104 Borderline applicants, faced with the
prospect of paying such fees repeatedly, may limit their housing searches to
inferior properties and less desirable neighborhoods rather than risk money
on application fees at high-quality rental properties they perceive as more
likely to deny them.105 On a collective level, this phenomenon may foster
the concentration of poverty and frustrate efforts to promote diverse and
economically integrated communities.
D. Social Consequences of Outsourcing to Tenant-Screening Services
A rental decision theoretically entails a unique evaluation of whether the
applicant’s household appears consistent with the nature of the housing and
whether the applicant is likely to comply with the relevant rules and
policies, coexist peaceably with the neighbors, and fulfill the financial
obligations of the tenancy. Yet in practice, this analysis is typically reduced
to a purely mechanical comparison of rigid suitability criteria against
individual applicants’ background reports. Tenant-screening services often
facilitate such decision making by marketing scores, recommendations, or
other opinions concerning prospective tenants, purportedly based on the raw
reports.106 Some invite landlords to outsource rental decisions entirely by
selling only the opinion (e.g., “accept” or “reject”) and withholding the data
upon which it is predicated.
For example, the Rental Housing Association of Puget Sound (RHA)
offers a product it calls “Rent Right,” in which the landlord is provided only
a decision (either “Approved,” “Approved with Conditions,” or “Declined”)
and is not given any reason for the decision or permitted to view any of the
applicant’s credit details.107 RHA extols this method as sparing landlords
“[t]he task of reading and understanding complex credit reports.”108 Unlike
housing providers themselves, a screening service has no countervailing
incentive to approve marginal tenants, which may cause screening
companies to apply the selection criteria more strictly than landlords would
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if making rental decisions themselves—though, under tighter rental market
conditions, even landlords themselves tend to be extremely selective.109
Rental recommendations, and the ultimate approvals or rejections, are
typically predicated on the broadly accepted assumption that a person’s past
is the best predictor of future performance—in this case, as a tenant. But its
strict application tends to produce controversial consequences that threaten
numerous public policy concerns. Rental policies excluding applicants who
lack a “stable housing history,” for instance, inhibit public efforts to combat
homelessness. Overly restrictive rules against applicants with criminal
records frustrate offender-reentry initiatives. Excluding applicants with
certain disfavored income sources (like housing vouchers, welfare benefits,
or child support) undermines the efficacy of poverty relief and welfare
programs. Rules which disqualify applicants with records of home
foreclosures tend to multiply, often arbitrarily, the economic and social ills
of the recent national foreclosure crisis. Then, probably the most significant
tenant-screening abuse is the widespread practice of automatically rejecting
applicants with “eviction” records.
Figure 2: “Rent Right Decision Model”
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In much of Washington, residential landlords commonly reject any
applicant who has been involved in an unlawful detainer litigation against a
prior landlord, period—regardless of whether the case resulted in a
judgment for the landlord and physical “eviction” of the tenant, a complete
dismissal and exoneration of the tenant on all claims, or anywhere in
between.110 It may be only natural that landlords seek to avoid leasing to
tenants they perceive as “high risk,” but the practice dramatically impairs
the rental housing opportunities of a significant number of Washington
families.111 On a widespread basis, this exclusionary practice erodes access
to our courts, weakens the due process rights of all residential tenants, and
relegates some to an intractable condition of homelessness.112
Rental policies which automatically disqualify applicants because of
unlawful detainer suits undermine access to justice by chilling tenants from
even appearing in landlord-tenant court.113 Tenants who have meritorious
defenses and compelling evidence often decide that preserving a particular
tenancy is not worth the damage that an unlawful detainer record will inflict
upon their future rental prospects—especially when that damage is not
ameliorated by a favorable outcome in the case.114 Consequently, rather
than assert defenses, tenants often decide simply to move out after being
served eviction notices or unfiled legal pleadings.115 Housing providers
justify these exclusions on grounds of efficiency and economy (since
obtaining and evaluating additional information about an unlawful detainer
action can impose significant costs, delays, and other difficulties), but
cynically, many landlords are equally or even more strongly averse to
having tenants who have successfully defended against eviction lawsuits by
prior housing providers.116
This phenomenon affects not only those tenants facing the specter of
eviction lawsuits, but any tenant who seeks to enforce rights against a
landlord. This can include demanding repairs, enforcing the provisions of a
lease agreement, objecting to discriminatory or retaliatory conduct, and so
forth.117 When a landlord may inflict a serious and permanent injury upon a
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tenant’s future housing opportunities merely by filing suit—a measure
solely within the landlord’s control—tenants are deterred from doing
anything they predict might invite litigation.118 Of course, not all tenants
avoid being sued for unlawful detainer or incurring other irreparable
injuries to their rent-worthiness.
E. The Result: “Unhouseables”
The process of screening prospective residential tenants naturally implies
that some will be accepted as tenants by particular landlords and others will
not. Though rental rejections may often be attributed to errors and false
impressions, plenty of rental applicants do have damaged credit, lack bank
accounts or other established credit, have been arrested or convicted of
criminal offenses, have been asked to leave previous rental properties, sued
for unlawful detainer, or evicted by a court, or have recently been homeless
or without verifiable “residential history.” Many of these would-be tenants
encounter great difficulty nowadays in locating willing landlords, often on
the basis of information that few landlords would have discovered before
the age of digitized records and free online databases.119 Indeed, as the
information available to landlords has increased, so too have the grounds
for rejecting applicants, especially in tight market conditions when overly
selective criteria are not punished.120
To many such applicants, the cost of these difficulties is measurable in
hours wasted in futile apartment searches and hundreds of dollars in
application fees.121 Yet many such applicants secure housing eventually—
even if in substandard facilities or less-than-desirable locations.
Increasingly, however, tarnished rental applicants are finding they are
unable to secure any housing at all.122 As a 2004 study observed in
connection with tenant-screening legislation then pending in Minnesota,
“the increasingly popular use of tenant-screening reports has resulted in a
new class of people who are unable to access rental housing because of past
credit problems, evictions, poor rental histories, or criminal
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backgrounds.”123 More locally, housing counselors and advocates from
major social services agencies, such as Seattle’s Solid Ground, have cited
tenant-screening as an issue of top priority to their clients and a first-rank
barrier to reducing homelessness in Washington.124

III. POTENTIAL REMEDIES UNDER EXISTING LAW
Though Washington has made no effort to comprehensively regulate the
tenant-screening industry, a handful of laws bearing more broadly on
subjects like fair housing, landlord-tenant, and credit reporting do reach
certain tenant-screening practices, sometimes substantially.
A. Tenant-Selection Criteria
Perhaps the most straightforward legal theory for challenging unfair
tenant-screening practices is a simple breach of contract claim. A person
who applies for rental housing presumably contracts with the landlord for a
good-faith consideration of her application (especially if a fee is paid), so a
landlord’s unreasonable rejection of the application could sustain an
actionable claim.125 An unreasonable or bad-faith basis for rejection might
be a ground contrary to the landlord’s established rental criteria,126 a reason
unrelated to predicting future performance in a tenancy, or some socially
malevolent basis that conflicts with public policy.127 Also, since a rental
application involves an interest in land, the unjust denial of a leasing
application constitutes an irreparable injury for which a court could order
specific performance.128 But, while appealing in the abstract, numerous
practical considerations undermine breach of contract as a viable legal
theory for addressing tenant-screening problems.
Two significant proof problems immediately emerge. While many do so
voluntarily, no law requires Washington landlords to establish, publish, or
abide by particular tenant-selection policies. Where tenant-selection policies
are tacit or even ad hoc, it may be impossible for an applicant to
demonstrate that he qualified for the rental under the relevant criteria. Even
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if the criteria are known, a rental applicant may be unable to prove a
deviation from those criteria because Washington law permits a landlord to
deny a rental application without disclosing the reasons for rejection.129 All
that Washington law does require is that the landlord inform the rental
applicant (either orally or in writing) of the denial, and if a tenant-screening
service was used the landlord must provide its name and address.130 This
lack of transparency may prevent a rental applicant from detecting that his
rental application was denied unfairly, let alone prove such a claim.
The lack of viable remedies is another significant obstacle. Since an
offending landlord will typically rent vacant premises to another tenant well
before a rejected applicant could bring a lawsuit or obtain relief, gaining
access to the desired premises is often not feasible.131 Even if the rental unit
is still available, many prospective tenants would probably prefer not to
start new tenancies with landlords embittered by litigation. Courts may also
be reluctant to issue injunctions likely to require extensive subsequent
oversight.132 This means damages, though inadequate as a matter of law,133
may be the only realistic remedy for a wrongful denial of rental housing
claim. Such damages, which might include the application fee, related
incidental costs, and possibly compensation for loss of expectation (e.g., if
the tenant had to pay more in rent or settle for inferior housing elsewhere),
would often appear inadequate to make bringing a lawsuit for damages
worthwhile, particularly given the absence of a fee-shifting statute.134
1. Residential Landlord-Tenant Act
An applicant who feels he was wrongfully denied rental housing may
also consider bringing an action under Washington’s Residential Landlord
Tenant Act (RLTA), a 1973 statute that governs most residential tenancies
in Washington.135 With one exception, the RLTA does not regulate the
grounds by which landlords may select tenants; but it does impose a general
duty of good faith in all landlord-tenant transactions.136 A landlord who
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rejects an applicant for an untenable reason (such as those discussed above)
theoretically violates this duty of good faith.
The RLTA, however, provides no specific remedy for a breach of the
duty of good faith, and in the only reported case discussing the provision,
the Washington Court of Appeals, Division I, openly questioned whether
the duty actually affords tenants “a substantive right to good faith treatment
by the landlord.”137 Basic principles of statutory construction suggest that
the RLTA duty of good faith is substantively enforceable,138 but without
specific remedies for a violation, the good faith provision appears scarcely
more helpful to rental applicants than the analogous breach of contract
theory.
2. Consumer Protection Act
Another statute that provides mistreated rental applicants with a potential
avenue for legal redress is the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), which
prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”139 Unlike the RLTA,
common law, or good faith theories discussed above, the CPA provides
distinct and potent remedies for persons injured by unfair or deceptive
practices, including actual damages, costs and attorney fees, injunctions
against “further violations,” and even exemplary damages.140 The
Washington Supreme Court has also authorized other types of equitable
relief in association with CPA claims on the basis of “[t]he superior court’s
inherent authority to enforce orders and fashion judgments.”141
To establish a CPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the scope of trade or
commerce, that the act or practice affects the public interest, and that the act
or practice injured the plaintiff.142 A rental applicant who is rejected for an
objectively unfair reason could, it would certainly appear, state a CPA claim
under these elements. The same kinds of tenant-selection policies that might
give rise to a common law or RLTA bad faith claim would presumably also
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enable a CPA unfair practice claim—indeed, “unfair” probably covers a
broader range of practices than “bad faith.”143 The leasing of residential
homes is commerce, and tenant-selection practices affect the public,
because landlords regularly advertise vacancies, solicit applications, and
make leasing decisions in the course of their business.144 But while the CPA
appears to be a promising tool for challenging unfair rental housing
rejections, appearances can sometimes be deceiving.
In 1985, the Washington Supreme Court ruled in State v. Schwab that
residential tenants may not sue landlords for unfair or deceptive practices
under the CPA.145 It is unclear whether (and to what extent) Schwab reaches
transactions between landlords and rental applicants (i.e., persons who have
applied for rental housing but have not yet been accepted as tenants).146 The
RLTA sets forth the rights and duties belonging to persons defined as
“landlords” and “tenants,” rental applicants are not mentioned, and the
definition of “tenant,” though broad (“any person who is entitled to occupy
a dwelling unit primarily for living or dwelling purposes under a rental
agreement”), does not embrace applicants.147 The original RLTA did not
feature any provisions governing transactions between landlords and
applicants, and no such components had been inserted by the time of
Schwab in 1985. Thus, it is reasonably clear the legislature did not
originally intend the RLTA, rather than the CPA, to govern transactions
between landlords and rental applicants.
However, in 1991 and 2004, two provisions governing transactions
between landlords and applicants were added to the RLTA.148 One of the
1991 amendments (now codified at RCW 59.18.253 and 257) limited the
fees landlords can charge for the cost of obtaining tenant-screening reports
and background information.149 The other provision imposed rules on
deposits to secure occupancy of rental units.150 These regulations benefit
prospective “tenants,” rather than the actual tenants to whom the RLTA
traditionally applied.151 Both provisions contain specific, self-contained
remedies, and neither provision purports to authorize a CPA claim.152
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The 1991 amendments are capable of two basic interpretations. One view
is that by extending the RLTA to some transactions between landlords and
“prospective tenants,” the legislature intended to bring all such relationships
under the RLTA and, thus, exempt them from the CPA (per Schwab).153
The other, more likely view, is that the legislature intended only to create a
remedy for people charged excessive application fees or unfair rental
deposits, and did not intend to fully determine which transactions between
residential landlords and nontenants belonged within the RLTA. Whereas
the RLTA had been a comprehensive statute governing practically all
aspects of the landlord-tenant relationship, the 1991 amendments were
directed at two specific problems: application fees and deposits. Also, the
1991 limits on fees and deposits were designed to make rental housing more
affordable to low-income people, not to counteract charges the legislature
had found unfair or deceptive.154 The CPA may, therefore, not have
appeared to be the appropriate enforcement tool. The findings did not
indicate any intention for the 1991 amendments to extend Schwab to all
transactions between residential landlords and rental applicants, or even any
explicit consideration that the amendments could have such an effect.155
In 2004, however, the RLTA acquired (for the first time) a provision that
actually regulates a ground upon which landlords may select tenants: the
Victim Protection Act (VPA).156 Among other things, the VPA prohibits a
residential landlord from denying a rental application because of the
person’s status as a victim of domestic violence or certain other crimes.157
Like the 1991 RLTA amendments, the VPA is codified under the RLTA
and provides specific, self-contained remedies for violations.158 The VPA
did not comprehensively regulate the field of possible transactions between
landlords and rental applicants; instead, it addresses a narrow set of specific
evils—housing discrimination against domestic violence victims and the
economic barriers to leaving abusive partners.159 Nevertheless, this
regulation of a tenant-selection criterion expands the RLTA into an area in
which it had been completely silent before 2004.
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It is highly doubtful that, in prohibiting landlords from rejecting tenants
on such an egregiously unfair and socially obnoxious basis as in the VPA,
the legislature truly intended to extend the RLTA—and with it Schwab—to
the full spectrum of residential tenant-selection decisions. But it can no
longer be denied that the RLTA reaches tenant-selection practices, and
some may interpret the VPA as evidence that the legislature assumed the
RLTA applied to tenant selection all along (and, thus, that claims based on
unfair tenant-screening practices are exempt from the CPA per Schwab).
Followed to its logical conclusion, this argument assumes, probably
unrealistically, that the legislature could not pass a law to protect domestic
violence victims from housing discrimination without also revisiting
Schwab. On the other hand, placing the VPA antidiscrimination provision
under the RLTA makes it consistent with the Law Against Discrimination,
under which housing discrimination claims are also specifically exempt
from CPA enforcement.160
It is likely only a matter of time before a Washington appellate court will
have to decide squarely whether or not Schwab extends to rental applicants;
in fact, several cases have come close. In the unpublished 2002 decision of
Collard v. Reagan, the Court of Appeals, Division II, upheld an award of
CPA damages to a group of rental applicants who had been scammed out of
application fees and deposits by a residential landlord.161 The landlord
argued on appeal that the CPA claim was barred by Schwab, but the Court
of Appeals did not consider the defense because the landlord had not
presented it to the trial court.162
More promising for rental applicants is the 2001 case of Ethridge v.
Hwang, in which the Washington Court of Appeals, Division I, declined to
extend Schwab to mobile home park tenancies.163 In Ethridge, a mobile
home park tenant attempted to sell his mobile home and located at least two
potential buyers, but the park refused to approve either buyer to live in the
park. The tenant contended that the park’s rejection of the buyers’ rental
applications—which effectively frustrated the sales—was an unfair practice,
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and brought several claims, including one under the CPA. The park
challenged the CPA claim, reasoning that relationships between mobile
home parks and their tenants are exclusively governed by the Mobile Home
Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA), and thus, by analogy to Schwab, the park
could not be held liable under the CPA.
The Court of Appeals rejected the park’s argument, finding that “[t]he
Legislature, in enacting the MHLTA to govern the unique case of mobile
home tenancies, implicitly rejected the idea that the MHLTA and RLTA are
substantially similar.”164 Because of a lack of detail in the Ethridge opinion,
it is not clear what points of dissimilarity the court found relevant between
the RLTA and MHLTA. But as none are immediately apparent, what
Ethridge and Collard, together with Eifler v. Shurgard Capital
Management165—a 1993 Court of Appeals, Division Two, decision holding
the CPA applicable to a claim by the tenant of a self-storage unit against the
storage company—may truly signal is a mounting discomfort with the far
reaches of Schwab among Washington’s appellate courts.
3. Antidiscrimination Laws
The clearest limitations on the criteria by which residential landlords may
select tenants arise under classic fair housing laws, such as the federal Fair
Housing Act166 and Washington’s Law Against Discrimination.167 Some
Washington cities and counties have enacted significant local fair housing
policies as well, such as Seattle’s Open Housing Ordinance168 or Tacoma’s
Law Against Discrimination,169 which extend antidiscrimination protections
to additional protected classes or broaden the membership of recognized
groups by defining existing protected classes differently. Many of the
problematic tenant-selection practices discussed above are assailable on fair
housing theories, and because discriminatory tenant-selection practices can
deprive others of opportunities to live in diverse communities, such
challenges can sometimes be brought even by persons outside the relevant
protected classes.170
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a) Disparate Treatment Theories
The most basic form of discrimination, “disparate treatment,” occurs
where a landlord “expressly treats members of a protected group differently
than others who are similarly situated.”171 Contemporary housing providers
rarely employ criteria that overtly exclude members of statutorily protected
classes or openly admit having rejected an applicant on a basis such as race,
ethnicity, or another protected status.172 However, many landlords do not
provide, and Washington law does not ordinarily require, any reason for
rejecting a rental application.173 A landlord who rejects an application
without explanation may, in fact, have denied the applicant for an unlawful,
discriminatory reason. Therefore, a rejected applicant who belongs to a
protected class can raise a prima facie case of disparate treatment through
circumstantial evidence by showing that he met the minimum qualifications
for the rental, and the property remained available for rent after he was
denied.174 Confronted with such a claim, a landlord acquires a burden to
“produce evidence that the refusal to rent or negotiate for a rental was
motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory considerations.”175 A housing
provider who cannot so justify a prospective tenant’s rejection may be liable
for housing discrimination.176
A landlord will ordinarily articulate at least a superficially legitimate
reason for rejecting a rental applicant. If nothing else, the classic disparate
treatment analysis can be useful for extracting such reasons. If the
explanation given is insincere or pretextual, the applicant may yet prevail
on the disparate treatment claim by refuting the justification.177 Often,
however, the housing provider’s basis for rejecting a rental application will
be a genuine policy that does not explicitly discriminate against members of
any protected class. Most of the reasons discussed above meet these
characteristics: a criminal record (whether arrests, charges, or convictions),
an unstable housing history, a past unlawful detainer, poor overall credit, a
negative reference by a prior landlord, etc.178 Contesting these kinds of
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rejections on fair housing grounds usually entails application of the more
sophisticated “disparate impact” theory.
b) Disparate Impact Claims
A rental applicant may establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination by demonstrating that her application was denied pursuant to
an “outwardly neutral practice” that causes “a significantly adverse or
disproportionate impact on persons of a particular type produced by the
defendant’s facially neutral acts or practices.”179 Statistical evidence is
appropriate and often essential to prove disparate impact claims, and only
the effects of the challenged practices are relevant—a plaintiff need not
show that the landlord harbored any intent to discriminate unlawfully.180 If a
rental applicant establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact, the
challenged tenant-selection rule is presumed unlawful; only by
demonstrating a “compelling business necessity” for the challenged practice
can a landlord overcome the presumption of discrimination.181
An example of a rental admissions policy that is “outwardly neutral” and
well-suited to a disparate impact challenge is one that automatically
excludes applicants with criminal records.182 Such a policy makes no
explicit distinction between applicants based on race, national origin,
gender, or any other protected status. Yet, a blanket exclusion of applicants
with criminal records has a substantial adverse and disproportionate impact
on African Americans who, as a group, are much more likely to be arrested,
charged with crimes, and imprisoned.183 A policy of this kind is, thus,
unlawful unless justified by a compelling business necessity.184 Such a
justification is likely untenable because some potential applicants may make
perfectly good tenants despite having criminal records, and because a
landlord could, instead of a rigid exclusion, evaluate applicants on a caseby-case basis and take other relevant factors—such as the nature of the
crime and evidence of rehabilitation—into consideration.185
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Countless other tenant-selection criteria are potentially assailable on
disparate impact grounds. Landlords who refuse certain forms of income,
such as welfare benefits, child support, or government housing subsidies,
disproportionately harm members of groups more heavily represented
among recipients of such income.186 Rigid minimum income rules (e.g.,
requiring applicants to have monthly income of three times the rent) can
unlawfully exclude members of groups more highly represented among the
local poverty population or exclude persons with disabilities, which
preclude them from earning wages or otherwise increasing their financial
resources.187 Requiring applicants to display a stable housing history may
have discriminatory results on those who are or have recently endured
homelessness, a group widely believed to consist disproportionately of
persons with mental illness or other disabling conditions.188 Similar claims
are possible on behalf of applicants who, despite having a background that
raises legitimate cause for concern (e.g., serious criminal offenses,
misconduct in past tenancies, a history of delinquency in the payment of
rent or household utilities, etc.), face exclusion even despite proof of
rehabilitation or changed circumstances.189
Ironically, many landlords who adhere to formulaic admissions policies
defend the practice as a means of avoiding unlawful discrimination in the
selection of tenants. The RHA, for instance, claims its “Rent-Right Decision
Model” saves landlords from “[p]otential inconsistent decision making,
which may lead to claims under federal fair housing laws.”190 Even if, as
RHA suggests, the objective of these products is to create only a veneer of
equal treatment, the consistent application of standard, written rental
admissions criteria across all manner of applicants is not generally
inconsistent with notions of fair housing. But because outwardly objective
rules often affect some applicants much more significantly than others—and
sometimes those disproportionate effects fall more harshly upon members
of protected classes—inflexible tenant-selection policies designed to
insulate landlords from fair housing claims may actually do them more
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harm than good, much to the chagrin of supposedly unwittingly
discriminating landlords.
c) Impediments to Disparate Impact Claims
While intuition and anecdotal evidence suggest that members of certain
protected classes are more deeply disadvantaged by particular tenantscreening methods, reliable statistical evidence with which to investigate,
confirm, and ultimately prove such disparate impact claims is often
unavailable and cost-prohibitive to obtain.191 For instance, a significant
empirical question in this regard is whether, and to what extent, unlawful
detainer defendants are more highly represented among certain racial and
ethnic groups or people with disabilities in Washington. The same factors
that lead to higher rates of poverty, welfare use, incarceration, and other
adverse economic statistics among people of color and people with
disabilities seem likely to contribute to higher rates of eviction and
nonjudicial displacement from housing.192 Some research shows that lowincome African-American women, especially those who are single mothers,
tend to face eviction at disproportionately higher rates.193
If members of one or more protected classes are significantly more likely
to be sued for unlawful detainer, then the categorical exclusion of rental
applicants with unlawful detainer records tends to cause a disparate impact
on such groups.194 But mounting a viable fair housing challenge to such
policies would require that the statistical evidence be assembled.
Washington courts do not keep demographic data on unlawful detainer
defendants, and no other reliable source from which such statistics might be
derived is readily apparent. Some out-of-state sources exist, but data that is
not specific to Washington or does not correlate directly to unlawful
detainer case filings, may not be adequate to support a viable claim.195
Common tenant-screening practices may also contribute to de facto
housing segregation in Washington communities.196 People seeking rental
housing are unlikely to apply where they expect to be rejected, especially
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when a screening fee is required.197 Whether or not the criteria by which
such rejections may occur are lawful, a rental applicant—particularly one
with limited funds—may rationally forego attempts to obtain rental housing
in preferred areas, and instead target less-desirable rental opportunities on
the calculation that the tenant-selection criteria will be less stringent.
Intuition suggests this process of self-screening, closely tied to the
anticipated use of customary-screening criteria, may result in an unequal
distribution of rental housing across racial, ethnic, and other lines. If so, fair
housing laws may again provide a legal remedy. Yet, the practical
impediments to establishing (or confirming the absence of) any such
correlations, a likely prerequisite to any effective judicial challenge, could
be even more intractable.198
Apart from the ever-present challenge of obtaining demographic statistics
and other costly empirical data to prove antidiscrimination laws, these laws
ultimately cannot do all the work of a comprehensive tenant-screening
regime. Abusive tenant-screening practices inflict negative social
consequences along an axis different from—if sometimes overlapping
with—that with which fair housing laws are concerned. Rental criteria that
disqualify applicants with poor overall credit, unstable housing history, old
or minor criminal records, undesirable income sources, or even some
evictions, tend to most heavily affect those who have experienced poverty
or homelessness—conditions that often correlate to race, gender, ethnicity,
or disability.
B. Challenging Inaccurate or Unfair Tenant-Screening Reports
1. RCW 59.18.257
The only state law regulating landlords who perform their own tenantscreening is RCW 59.18.257, a provision of the RLTA that restricts a
landlord from charging a prospective tenant more than the “actual costs in
obtaining the background information, [up to] the customary costs charged
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by a screening service in the general area.”199 The payment of a tenantscreening fee is conditioned upon the landlord’s disclosure “in writing of
what a tenant screening entails [and] the prospective tenant’s rights to
dispute the accuracy of information provided by the [entities] who will be
contacted for information concerning the tenant[.]”200 Liability for violating
this provision is limited to “an amount not to exceed one hundred dollars.”
However, an applicant’s incentive to enforce this right is further lessened in
that the statute authorizes an award of court costs and attorney fees to the
prevailing party—not necessarily a successful plaintiff.201
Although this provision appears to offer little practical value to rental
applicants, a few points are intriguing from a regulatory standpoint. First,
the applicant’s “right to dispute the accuracy of information provided,”
whether by a tenant-screening service or by “entities listed on the tenant
application who will be contacted,” undoubtedly references the applicant’s
right to lodge a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) dispute with the tenantscreening service202 and possibly a “furnisher” (that is, an entity that
provided information to the screening service).203 It is plausible that this
right to dispute inaccurate information may also guarantee an applicant the
opportunity to present that dispute to the prospective new landlord.204
The other logical interpretation of the “right to dispute the accuracy of
information provided by the . . . entities listed on the tenant application”205
would be recognition of a right to present the dispute directly to a past
landlord, personal reference, or other person who supplied adverse
information directly to the new landlord (but not via a tenant-screening
service).206 But this interpretation would render the statutorily-referenced
“right” superfluous, because no duties are imposed on such sources to
reinvestigate, reconsider, or correct any inaccurate information they may
have supplied or to inform the prospective landlord of any such errors or
corrections.207 Recognizing a right to contest information with the
prospective landlord not only gives force to the statutory language but it
also appears most consistent with the pronounced legislative intent: “for
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prospective tenants to be informed of their rights to dispute information
they feel is inaccurate in order to help prevent denials of housing based
upon incorrect information.”208
If RCW 59.18.257 does establish a right to dispute inaccurate
information with the prospective landlord, the statute is silent regarding the
extent of consideration that landlords must afford to such disputes.209 But in
view of the RLTA’s universal duty of good faith, it is not unreasonable to
expect that a landlord must evaluate the dispute with at least some degree of
substantive fairness, and perhaps more controversially, that the dispute must
be considered before the premises are leased to another person.210
Several other ambiguous terms in RCW 59.18.257 are also worth closer
examination. For instance, the RLTA contains no definition for “tenantscreening service.”211 The term probably refers to a consumer-reporting
agency212 that makes consumer reports for use in approving or rejecting
rental applications. But with no statutory definition, it is possible that
“tenant-screening service” could be interpreted more broadly, and may draw
in entities not included within the federal or state FCRA definitions of a
“consumer reporting agency.”
Also, the landlord’s duty to “notif[y] the prospective tenant in writing of
what a tenant screening entails” is nowhere further clarified.213 This could
mean that the landlord is required to inform the applicant of the type of
background information the landlord will obtain, or it may require more
details about the sources that will be contacted or specific questions asked.
“[W]hat a tenant screening entails” could also include information about the
landlord’s tenant-selection criteria, again in more or less detail—arguably, a
housing provider that rejects a rental application based on criteria that were
not disclosed to the tenant in writing before accepting a screening fee
violates this section.214
Still another ambiguity regarding RCW 59.18.257 is the statute’s silence
as to whether a landlord may charge an applicant for the cost of obtaining a
tenant-screening report if the same or a substantially similar report (i.e., one
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with virtually identical contents) is available to the landlord free of charge.
Even if most screening services will not prepare a report at the request of a
consumer,215 once a report has been prepared, the FCRA requires a tenantscreening company to disclose that report to the applicant on request,216 and
for free if requested within sixty days of an adverse action.217 No law
prevents unsuccessful rental applicants from obtaining a copy of their
screening report and then presenting that same report to other prospective
landlords in subsequent applications.
It is plausible that RCW 59.18.257 could preclude a landlord who is
offered such a “recycled” report from charging the applicant for the costs of
obtaining another largely duplicative screening report.218 The statute
authorizes a landlord to charge only “his or her actual costs in obtaining the
background information,” and when the background information is
available to the landlord free of charge, arguably the landlord’s “actual
cost” for that information is $0.219 This would mean that a housing provider
who insists on ordering a new tenant-screening report, rather than accept a
substantially similar applicant-supplied report, could not lawfully charge the
applicant for the cost of the additional report. The legislature does not
appear to have anticipated that applicants would attempt to reuse tenantscreening reports, but this construction is consistent with the spirit and
purpose of RCW 59.18.257, making rental housing more accessible and
affordable to low-income renters.220
2. Disputes with Tenant-Screening Services
No federal or Washington statute at present defines “tenant-screening
service” or any equivalent,221 but usage suggests that it refers to a person or
business that compiles and transmits consumer reports bearing on a
person’s fitness for leasing and occupying rental property.222 Such entities
are a type of CRA subject to the state and federal Fair Credit Reporting
Acts (FRCAs),223 which prohibit CRAs from negligently reporting
inaccurate or outdated information to landlords for use in selecting
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tenants.224 Rental applicants certainly enjoy all of the same FCRA rights
and protections pertinent to other consumer-reporting agencies.225 An
exhaustive exploration of possible FCRA violations is beyond the scope of
this article, but several distinct practices inconsistent with FCRA duties are
common among, or unique to, tenant-screening agencies.
At the heart of the FCRA is a requirement that “[w]henever a consumer
reporting agency prepares a consumer report, it shall follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information
concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”226 “Preparing” a
consumer report is distinguished in the same FCRA provision from
“reselling” a report obtained from another CRA, such as a credit report or
private criminal background check.227 Hence, the duty to follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy applies to tenantscreening agencies, most heavily with respect to eviction records, criminal
background checks based on public record searches, recommendations or
other evaluations of rent-worthiness, and other original content generated
by screening services.
In requiring “reasonable procedures” (for assuring the maximum
accuracy of information in a consumer report), the FCRA does not impose
strict liability for making a false consumer report.228 Rather, the statute
applies a negligence standard under which the reasonableness of a consumer
reporting procedure depends generally on “what a reasonably prudent
person would do under the circumstances.”229 This is ordinarily a question
of fact.230 The main factors in this analysis are the degree of harm a
particular inaccuracy may potentially cause the consumer, the availability of
procedures for improving accuracy, and the costs and burdens those
additional procedures would impose.231 A fourth relevant factor may be the
resources (or lack thereof) available to the particular screener.232
As noted above, a prevailing practice among tenant-screening services in
Washington is to report any filed unlawful detainer action as an “eviction,”
based on the SCOMIS index alone, without explanation of underlying facts,
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claims and defenses, or final disposition.233 Of course, a more effective way
to guarantee accuracy of eviction reports would be to access and review the
complete court records from unlawful detainer suits, rather than relying on
the SCOMIS entries only.234 Typical documents in an unlawful detainer
case file will include a complaint, an answer, motions, exhibits,
declarations, court orders, and other materials setting forth the specific
facts, arguments, findings, and particular circumstances of the suit.235 Thus,
tenant-screening companies that report eviction suits without reviewing
court files or taking other precautions probably do not follow reasonable
procedures to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of their reports and
would likely be found liable under the FCRA if a resulting report is
inaccurate or casts the rental applicant in a false light.236 The Ninth Circuit
has held that a CRA must consult and properly interpret court records when
reinvestigating a consumer dispute,237 and the California Court of Appeals
has held that a tenant-screening agency may not follow reasonable
procedures if it makes an initial report based solely on a register of actions
(comparable to Washington’s SCOMIS) without further review of the court
file.238
Nonetheless, current tenant-screening industry practices appear
predicated on the assumption that the costs and burdens of reviewing and
interpreting complete unlawful detainer case files before making tenantscreening reports would be found to exceed the FCRA reasonableness
test.239 This precaution would entail both the logistical burden of obtaining
the relevant documents and require the expertise to properly interpret and
report the contents.240 Yet, because the potential harm to a rental applicant
from an incorrect, incomplete, or misleading eviction report is so
substantial,241 screening services can be expected to incur significant costs
and burdens to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of those reports.242
Given the particular need for tenant-screening reports to be accurate the first
time around, rather than on reinvestigation,243 Washington tenant-screening
agencies should adequately research and confirm unlawful detainer filings
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before reporting them to prospective landlords, and any such reports should
include information favorable to the tenants (such as a positive outcome,
meritorious defenses, or mitigating facts and circumstances apparent from
the court documents).
The omission of case outcomes, mitigating circumstances, and other key
facts concerning unlawful detainer suits is most defensible in counties that
do not make superior court documents available online, as the costs and
delays of obtaining the necessary information are likely greatest where
access to the relevant records entails a physical visit to a (potentially
distant) courthouse either by the screening agency itself or through a
subcontractor.244 But in jurisdictions like King County, where superior court
records are accessible online at a low cost, the assumption that ascertaining
and disclosing case dispositions or other details of UD suits (in initial
tenant-screening reports) would be found to impose an unreasonable burden
on consumer reporting agencies is highly suspect.245 Also undermining the
contention that such completeness not feasible in unlawful detainer reports
is Washington’s Criminal Records Privacy Act, which requires law
enforcement agencies to report the disposition of an offense whenever a
nonconviction record of the offense is reported.246
A less-effective precaution for ensuring the accuracy of eviction records
would be to cross-reference unlawful detainer records with other materials
available to the screening service, especially the applicant’s credit report.
For instance, if the credit report reveals a judgment in favor of the landlord,
the screening service might justifiably presume the action was resolved
adversely to the applicant (although this is not always true, as the contents
of a court order often reflect different results than the title may suggest).247
Or, if an applicant continued to reside at disputed premises for a significant
length of time after an unlawful detainer suit—thus, suggesting that the case
may have been dismissed or otherwise resolved without an eviction—the
agency may need to conduct a further investigation to prepare a complete
and accurate report.248 Since a screening agency will almost always obtain
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an applicant’s credit report anyway (usually for resale as part of the
screening package), these procedures—albeit imperfect—entail minimal
cost and effort.
3. Public Records
Regardless of the measures tenant-screening services take to ensure the
accuracy of their reports, true fairness in the rental application process will
remain elusive absent tighter controls on the creation, storage, and
dissemination of the public records upon which those screening reports are
largely based. Much of the information in tenant-screening reports consists
of repackaged data mined from various public databases, many of which
were never intended as sources for consumer reports. Once information
contained in public records—especially judicial records—reaches the public
domain, there are few effective limits on either a tenant-screening firm’s
further dissemination or a landlord’s use of that information in choosing
tenants. Thus, keeping harmful information from reaching the public
records in the first place or limiting the distribution of such records may be
the most practical avenue for preserving tenants’ rental-housing prospects.
a) Nonconviction Criminal Records
Washington has extensively regulated the dissemination of nonconviction
criminal records (most notably arrests).249 Generally, a nonconviction
record may be disseminated only if it “states the disposition of such charge
to the extent dispositions have been made at the time of the request.”250
Inaccurate nonconviction records are subject to dispute and correction
procedures,251 and all such records are deleted after two years.252 Only
records of convictions “may be disseminated without restriction.”253 These
rules do not entirely eliminate the risk that a person may be denied housing
based on an unjustified arrest or unproven criminal charge, but they do
substantially shorten the duration of time that risk can deny that person
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housing (as compared with civil litigation records, which may be reported
for up to seven years).254
b) Litigation Records (Criminal and Civil)
Washington courts have the inherent authority to seal judicial records,255
that is, to “protect [the court file or court record] from examination by the
public and unauthorized court personnel.”256 This authority extends to all
judicial records, including criminal cases, civil cases, and even to records of
conviction for felonies or other serious crimes.257 However, because the
Washington Constitution expressly protects the openness of judicial
proceedings, courts exercise the authority to seal court records under only
very limited circumstances.258 So far, Washington has recognized only two
such grounds for limiting public access to court proceedings (or records
thereof): where public access threatens a criminal defendant’s right to a fair
trial, or where public access unreasonably interferes with a person’s right to
privacy.259
Preserving one’s access to rental housing is a privacy interest that can
establish grounds for sealing a judicial record that diminishes a person’s
rental prospects.260 Thus, unlawful detainer defendants, criminal defendants,
and other litigants about whom prejudicial judicial records exist may, in
some circumstances, obtain orders sealing those records from the public
view and, by extension, from tenant-screening companies.261 Though a
promising remedy, the legal standard to secure an order to seal records is
high, and as it is subject to considerable trial court discretion, may not be
consistently applied across a range of cases.
Judicial records may be sealed on privacy grounds only if the proponent
of sealing demonstrates “compelling privacy or safety concerns that
outweigh the public’s interest in access to the record.”262 Protecting access
to rental housing is a compelling concern only if the person shows an actual
need for rental housing and that sealing the record will materially increase
his ability to obtain it.263 Even if judicial records are sealed for this reason,
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the court may only seal the records as narrowly as necessary to achieve the
privacy-related objective.264 In one recent case, the Washington Court of
Appeals, Division I, went so far as to suggest that an order to seal the record
of an improperly filed unlawful detainer action might not be justified if an
adequate mechanism could be created enabling a tenant to “insert an
explanation into [SCOMIS] analogous to that which an individual can insert
into a credit history.”265
4. Due Process Concerns
The courts’ reluctance to seal records, coupled with residential landlords’
pervasive practice of categorically excluding applicants who have been sued
for unlawful detainer, raises due process concerns not typical of other
record-sealing contexts. When simply appearing on a court-maintained list
of unlawful detainer defendants materially diminishes a person’s rentalhousing opportunities,266 a rental applicant may be entitled to heightened
procedural safeguards in seeking removal from that list—or in avoiding
being named to the list in the first place.267 Also, while unlawful detainer
defendants are seldom denied fair trials in individual cases by prejudicial
publicity, the widespread use of SCOMIS as a de facto rental-housing
blacklist tends collectively to deny tenants equal access to the civil justice
system.
Washington courts have yet to grapple with these due process
considerations, but the solution could be a lessening of the “compelling
interest” standard applicable to requests sealing unlawful detainer records.
A criminal defendant who seeks to close a court proceeding or seal a record
to protect her right to a fair trial need only meet a much lower standard:
“reasonable possibility of prejudicial publicity.”268 Civil trials generally
require fewer procedural safeguards than criminal prosecutions, where
threats of incarceration or other severe punishments loom, but the
systematic impairment of residential tenants’ due process rights injures not
only the litigants but also damages the integrity of the tribunal itself.
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Therefore, sealing certain unlawful detainer records protects the interests of
both the affected tenants and the courts as well.
Sealing unlawful detainer records more readily could greatly counteract
this erosion of judicial access. Giving tenants a reasonable expectation that
a mere record of an unlawful detainer case filing will not materially
diminish their future housing prospects, should they prevail or settle on
favorable terms, could lessen the chilling effect that precludes many from
asserting and litigating meritorious defenses.269 This could be largely
accomplished just by redacting the full names of unlawful detainer
defendants from judicial records, leaving the balance of the court files
largely intact.270 Such redaction would have no discernable effect on the
public’s ability to monitor and evaluate the court’s adjudication of cases—
the central function underlying the constitutional mandate that justice be
administered openly.271

IV. POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENTS
As databases merge and the ranks of the “unhouseables” swell, the need
for new consumer protections respecting the realities of the information age
could not be more pressing. Four distinct forms of enhanced protections
appear specifically appropriate.
First, a practical method for enabling tenants to obtain, review, and
dispute inaccurate or improper contents in their tenant-screening reports is
necessary to breathe life into existing Fair Credit Reporting Act protections.
Second, effective controls on the dissemination and use of information in
public records and databases, such as SCOMIS, that consumer reporting
agencies have appropriated and used as de facto credit reports (or
sometimes blacklists) are in order. Third, tenant-selection criteria that clash
with important public policy interests should be curtailed. Fourth, some
mechanism for controlling screening costs is needed to ensure that
individuals and families with marginal “rent-worthiness” are not steered
into substandard housing—or denied access altogether—by having to pay
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multiple times for the same reports. Finally, Washington should either
devote adequate public resources to meet the housing needs of those
remaining persons who will inevitably fail the tenant-screening criteria or
implement measured controls on the exclusionary rental-admissions policies
of private housing providers.272
A. Portable Screening Reports
“Portable” tenant-screening reports (i.e., reports an applicant could reuse
in applying for housing at successive providers) would appreciably advance
two of these objectives. Most directly, portable reports would exert
significant downward pressure on screening costs by enabling applicants to
pay just one fee per housing search, rather than a separate fee for every
application. Portable reports could also give tenants a way to monitor their
reports for accuracy and to meaningfully challenge inappropriate contents
under the FCRA dispute process.
Establishing portable screening reports would require only two minor
legal adjustments. The first would be a law compelling screening services to
compile and disclose tenant-screening reports at the request of a consumer,
as at least one Washington tenant-screening company does already.273 This
would assure renters the ability to obtain their screening reports, review
them for accuracy, and dispute incorrect items before applying for
housing,274 when the existing FCRA dispute and reinvestigation may be of
use.275
The second factor necessary to make screening reports “portable” would
be to ensure that housing providers actually accept such tenant-vetted
reports. Housing providers often form preferences for specific screening
companies and may be reluctant to accept or use reports from other
sources.276 As representatives for a major landlord trade association told the
Washington Legislature in 2009, many landlords also fear that tenantsupplied reports could be altered or fabricated (a particular concern where
the tenant may have access to the report before it reaches the landlord).277
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Prohibiting landlords from obtaining screening reports from their
preferred sources would likely be unconstitutional. But the Legislature
could clarify RCW 59.18.257(1) to make clear that a landlord may not
charge an applicant for a new screening report when a sufficient portable
report is available for free. If landlords had to choose between relying on
the portable report or bearing further screening costs themselves, it is
reasonable to expect that many landlords would accept the portable reports,
particularly reports created by reputable screening firms. Requiring portable
screening reports to contain certain basic components (such as a credit
report, criminal background check, and eviction history), meet minimal
standards of quality, and be transmitted to housing providers in a manner
that ensures the reports are not subject to fraud or alteration, could make
portability a reality.278
A comprehensive approach to portability was recently proposed in the
Fair Tenant Screening Act (FTSA), a bill that has steadily gained
momentum279 since its introduction to the Washington Legislature in the
2009–2010 biennium.280 Under the FTSA as originally proposed, a
screening service that receives a fee for issuing a tenant-screening report
about a specific rental applicant would be obligated to provide copies of
that same report at no charge “to any prospective landlord who has been
authorized by the prospective tenant to receive the report” for the sixty-day
period thereafter.281 To protect landlords from alteration or fraud, a
screening service would provide the copy directly to the landlord.282
Another section of the FTSA would prohibit landlords from charging
tenant-screening costs to any applicant for whom such a free report was
available—provided the report is a “comprehensive screening report,”
which the bill defines as a report containing the applicant’s “criminal
history,” “eviction history,” and “credit report.”283
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B. Enhanced Controls on Dissemination of Civil Litigation Records
Washington currently does very little to restrict public access to civil
litigation records or to control dissemination of such records, and virtually
nothing to limit the end use of such information. Yet, even true and accurate
information in civil litigation records—unlawful detainer records, in
particular—can be, and often is, used to deny housing in ways that are
unfair to the applicant or that undermine public policy. Keeping unlawful
detainer records, as well as other damaging civil litigation records (e.g.,
domestic violence protection order cases or rent collection lawsuits), from
reaching prospective landlords and tenant-screening companies would be
the most effective response to this problem of unfair or socially deleterious
use. Even a narrow provision enabling persons with undeserved eviction
histories to more readily seal unlawful detainer records (including from
SCOMIS itself) could prevent many unjust housing denials and restore
much of the procedural fairness that the screening industry’s exploitation of
judicial records has eroded.
Such a mechanism would need two key features to be effective. First, the
prospect of obtaining an order to seal the necessary court records must be
virtually ensured for cases in which the tenant prevails or settles on
favorable terms. A tenuous prospect of sealing one’s name is unlikely to
diminish the chilling effect that blacklisting (via unlawful detainer
registries) exerts on a tenants considering whether to litigate unlawful
detainer actions. Second, the provision must close any “back doors” through
which housing providers and screening services might obtain the sealed
information.284 This would include language relieving applicants from
having to disclose sealed case information on rental applications, as well as
a restriction against reporting sealed case information remaining in private
“shadow” databases.
The version of the FTSA bill introduced in the Washington Senate
contained a record-sealing proposal that would have lessened the standard
for sealing or redacting unlawful detainer records in specified circumstances
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where limiting public access would promote the public interest.285 These
included cases that were settled or where the tenant prevailed, cases filed
against tenants whose landlords had recently lost the properties in
foreclosure, and cases based on nonpayment of rent where the tenant
“reinstates” the tenancy (by paying the arrearage and any associated costs,
fees, or other court-awarded sums within five days after judgment).286 Upon
a showing that such a circumstance existed, a rebuttable presumption would
arise that protecting the tenant’s housing prospects is more important than
allowing unfettered public access to the case records.287 Unless rebutted by
facts peculiar to that case, this presumption would establish grounds for
sealing the records necessary to preserve the tenant’s rental opportunities.288
California, taking an even more aggressive approach to this problem,
“masks” the filing of unlawful detainer cases automatically and unseals
those records only if the landlord is found to be the prevailing party.289 The
California statute may be more advantageous to tenants in that the masking
occurs automatically and in all cases. However, the parties have less control
over the administration of the masking, which may expose tenants to
bureaucratic errors or delays and make such problems more difficult to
correct than the litigant-directed process envisioned by the FTSA. More
significantly, California’s wholesale removal of unlawful detainer records
from public view may be unconstitutional in Washington.290
C. Fair Credit Reporting Act Amendments
Washington could further improve fairness for rental-housing seekers by
improving its Fair Credit Reporting Act. Milder improvements—such as
expressly requiring the inclusion of favorable information and more
complete disclosure of facts, circumstances, and outcomes of civil cases in
tenant-screening reports—could improve the overall accuracy of the
information used in rental decisions. Regular access to more complete
information might induce some housing providers to adopt more nuanced
tenant-selection policies. A stronger approach would be to restrict CRAs
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from reporting even certain true and accurate unlawful detainer filings, such
as cases brought for retaliatory or other illegitimate purposes, or where the
tenant prevailed, or where the court lacked jurisdiction. Public policy
interests could support limitations on reporting unlawful detainers involving
post-foreclosure evictions or—in view of the due process considerations
implicated by unlawful detainer reports—cases dismissed or settled before
adjudication.
Consistent with the latter approach, the proposed FTSA would have
prohibited tenant-screening services from reporting several types of
unlawful detainer suits, including cases in which the tenant was not found
“guilty of unlawful detainer or otherwise in unlawful possession of the
premises, post-foreclosure evictions, or judgments that were vacated,
expunged, or sealed.”291 The FTSA would also have precluded reporting
“qualified victim protection records,” which encompassed various “records
or information indicating that the person, about whom the records or
information pertains, is a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or
stalking, or protected by a court order.”292
1. Free Speech Considerations
In 1992, California passed legislation prohibiting CRAs from reporting
any unlawful detainer actions except those in which the tenant lost.293 A
landlord association and a tenant-screening company challenged the statute,
and a trial court held it unconstitutional on the grounds that “it prohibit[ed]
truthful reporting of ‘information contained in court files that are fully
available to the public and which can be freely reported and copied by any
other person, entity or member of the media.’”294 A division of the
California Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in U.D. Registry v. State of
California (hereafter “U.D. Registry I”), concluding that “[o]nce true
information is disclosed in public court documents open to public
inspection, the press [or other members of the public] cannot be sanctioned
for publishing it.”295 Because the proposed FTSA would, likewise, enact
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new limitations on the dissemination of information in the public domain
(by commercial tenant-screening companies), similar constitutional
questions may also arise in connection with Washington’s tenant-screening
legislation.296
A crucial factor in the outcome of U.D. Registry I was the court’s
determination that unlawful detainer information in tenant-screening reports
did not constitute commercial speech.297 Content-based regulations of
commercial speech are analyzed under a four-step test established by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v.
Public Service Commission of New York.298 Under Central Hudson,
commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection only if it
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.299 The government bears the
burden of justifying the restriction300 and will succeed only if the regulation
directly advances a substantial government interest and is no more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.301 Having found the
regulated speech at issue (i.e., the contents of tenant-screening reports) not
to have been commercial speech, however, the U.D. Registry I court applied
the much more rigorous strict scrutiny, under which a restriction on speech
is presumed unconstitutional “absent a need to further a state interest of the
highest order.”302
Despite finding that “[c]oncern about the availability of rental housing
for those needing housing, and particularly those facing eviction, is a valid
and significant state interest,” the U.D. Registry I court struck down the
California statute, finding it did “not justify a ban on publication by credit
reporting agencies of lawfully obtained truthful information contained in
court records open to the perusal of everyone.”303 Viewed in isolation, U.D.
Registry I casts a dark cloud over Washington’s ability to improve its own
FCRA. Indeed, the regulations concerning the inclusion of certain unlawful
detainer and victim protection records proposed in the FTSA304 are
substantially similar to the restrictions that the U.D. Registry I court
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declared unconstitutional.305 In its proper context, however, U.D. Registry I
is an outlier that has since been called into serious question.306
In 2002, California adopted additional “security freeze” provisions to its
state fair credit reporting act because of heightened concerns regarding
identity theft.307 The security freeze provision authorized a consumer to
place a note in her credit report that would “prohibit [a CRA] from releasing
the consumer’s credit report or any information from it without the express
authorization of the consumer.”308 Once again, U.D. Registry brought a
constitutional challenge to the statute.309 This time, however, a different
division of the California Court of Appeals ruled, in U.D. Registry II, that
the question of “whether the expression proposes a commercial transaction
is no longer the sole standard of First Amendment review [and that] there is
no single bright line test for defining commercial speech.”310 This
conclusion directly contravened the U.D. Registry I court, which had
declared that “truthful information, taken from public records regarding
unlawful detainer defendants, does not propose a commercial transaction
and, hence, is not commercial speech.”311
Reviewing both California and U.S. Supreme Court precedents, the U.D.
Registry II court further noted that the contents of tenant-screening reports
could be considered “commercial speech” under cases extending the term’s
definition beyond language proposing commercial transactions to reach
such things as an alcohol-content label on beer bottles or a statement on an
attorney’s letterhead indicating the lawyer was a CPA.312 With “ambiguities
exist[ing] at the margins of what may be categorized as commercial
speech,” the U.D. Registry II court opted to evaluate the security freeze
statute under intermediate (Central Hudson) scrutiny.313 Ironically, the
security freeze law then failed to survive under intermediate scrutiny,
leading the U.D. Registry II court to leave undecided whether the contents
of a consumer report are indeed commercial speech.314
Thus, additional restrictions that Washington might place on permissible
contents of tenant-screening reports would likely survive a constitutional
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challenge because tenant-screening reports very likely do constitute
commercial speech. Being speech of a purely private nature and not
concerning matters of public importance, a tenant-screening report warrants
“significantly less constitutional interest.”315 A tenant screening report does
not itself propose a commercial transaction, but is closely related to a
proposed commercial transaction and is certainly “expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”316 Regulating
screening reports is consistent with the government’s interest in protecting
the public against unfair business practices.317 The U.D. Registry II court,
which itself tilted toward—though stopping short of—finding that all
consumer reports are commercial speech, observed that numerous federal
courts have already determined that the contents of consumer reports are
commercial speech and treated them as such.318 Assuming Washington
follows U.D. Registry II and the greater weight of authority in concluding
that tenant-screening reports are indeed commercial speech, then new
restrictions on their contents would merit intermediate (Central Hudson)
scrutiny, not the strict scrutiny to which the regulations challenged in U.D.
Registry I were subjected.319
Carefully drawn restrictions on the reporting of unlawful detainer actions,
victim-protection records, and other civil litigation materials could easily
survive a review under intermediate scrutiny. The government has a
substantial interest in preventing applicants from being unfairly denied
access to rental housing, 320 and regulating unlawful detainer reports would
directly advance that interest. Other substantial interests, such as preserving
the due process rights of residential tenants or deterring retaliation (e.g.,
against tenants who demand repairs or lodge complaints about their
landlords), could also sustain such a regulation—while these interests
would be advanced somewhat less directly, the government need only
“demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in
fact alleviate them to a material degree.”321
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Taking a lesson from U.D. Registry II, Washington could ensure that its
regulation is narrowly tailored by limiting the reporting of only certain
“unfair” court records, rather than extending such restrictions to all eviction
suits (or beyond specific well-drawn categories), and applying the
restrictions only where the records are sought for tenant-screening purposes
(rather than all consumer or employment transactions).322 Laws prohibiting
tenant-screening companies from reporting information (including court
records) in a false or misleading manner would receive no constitutional
protection at all under Central Hudson.323
The proposed FTSA would appear to survive constitutional review with
respect to its limitations on both unlawful detainer reports, as discussed
above, as well as “qualified victim-protection records.”324 The restrictions
are narrowly drawn; the same government interest in preventing applicants
from being unfairly denied access to rental housing pertains to both victimprotection records and select unlawful detainer records.325 Prohibiting the
reporting of victim-protection records also advances substantial government
interests in protecting privacy rights and reducing violence against women.
2. Preemption
A state attempting to regulate tenant-screening reports could also face a
potential preemption problem arising under the federal FCRA,326 a
provision of which prohibits any state from making a post-1996 law “with
respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 1681c of [Title 15
U.S.C.] relating to information contained in consumer reports.”327 In turn,
section 1681c prohibits CRAs from reporting “[c]ivil suits, civil judgments,
and records of arrest that, from date of entry, antedate the report by more
than seven years or until the governing statute of limitations has expired,
whichever is the longer period.”328
Because unlawful detainer actions are a type of civil suit, if the reporting
of civil suits is a “subject matter regulated under section 1681c,”329 then a
new state law regulation on the reporting of civil suits would be
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preempted.330 This contention appears highly plausible at first blush,
because many CRAs operate nationally, and Congress may have intended to
create a national standard for what can and cannot be included in a
consumer report.331 But this preemption argument rests on a flawed
premise.
The congressional intent behind section 1681c(a) was to prevent CRAs
from reporting outdated information.332 The statute prescribes various time
limits beyond which even true and accurate information cannot be
reported—including civil suits and judgments older than seven years.333
Hence, the “subject matter regulated” under section 1681c(a) is the duration
for which certain information can be reported before it must be deleted due
to outdatedness. Advocates of the preemption claim turn section 1681c(a)
on its head, construing the rule as an implicit authorization to report any and
all civil suits and judgments that are not outdated. Yet section 1681c does
not actually authorize CRAs to report anything; it simply specifies some
items that cannot be reported.334
The possibility that Congress intended section 1681c to implicitly
authorize CRAs to report any information not specifically prohibited therein
is rebutted by the fact that section 1681c is not the only part of the FCRA
that restricts CRAs from reporting certain types of information. Under
section 1681i(a)(5), for instance, a civil suit or judgment cannot be
reported—even if true, accurate, and less than seven years old—unless it
can be verified upon reinvestigation.335 Indeed, the lack of a conflict
between sections 1681c and 1681i, either of which might forbid the
reporting of information permitted by the other, reinforces the conclusion
that the “subject matter regulated” by section 1681c is the time for which
credit information remains current, not whether specific types of
information (e.g., civil suits and judgments) may be reported at all.336
As laws restricting CRAs from reporting information on grounds other
than outdatedness do not regulate the same subject matter as section
1681c(a), such restrictions that originate from state or local enactments are
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not preempted by section 1681t(b).337 Consistent with this view, some other
states have enacted laws either restricting CRAs from reporting true,
nonoutdated information or governing the manner in which such
information may be reported.338

CONCLUSION
Tenant-screening is, ultimately, a response to the inherent risks of leasing
residential housing. It cannot be denied that some tenants will inevitably
default in rent, damage the rental premises, violate criminal laws, or have
other negative effects if admitted. Unsuccessful tenancies carry adverse
economic repercussions, which landlords naturally seek to avoid. Tenant
screening that accurately predicts which applicants are more or less likely to
become successful tenants can lessen these risks. This undeniable economic
justification makes tenant-screening difficult, if not impossible, to ever
condemn absolutely. But while it may be the prerogative of housing
providers to choose their tenants carefully, this does not mean tenantscreening must persistently trump other overriding public interests.
Fair housing laws, which prohibit only the most insufferable forms of
tenant-selection criteria, establish that housing providers have no
inalienable right to choose tenants on whatever grounds they prefer.339 But
the exclusion of tenants for other arbitrary reasons (i.e., besides membership
in established protected classes) can also produce socially deleterious
effects. The most significant of these adverse consequences include
undermining the integrity of unlawful detainer courts and creating a pool of
individuals and families lacking realistic access to rental housing. Even
federally-subsidized public housing—in many communities the housing of
last resort for the indigent and disabled—“[p]reclud[es] admission of
applicants whose habits and practices reasonably may be expected to have a
detrimental effect on the residents or the project environment.”340 This is
perhaps only common sense; yet, one can only wonder how policies such as
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this can be reconciled with other policy goals, such as the state’s laudable
pledge to “end homelessness in Washington by July 15, 2015.”341
A well-conceived regulatory scheme could appreciably reduce the extent
to which tenant-screening contributes to homelessness and other social ills,
especially where the method of exclusion inflicts the social harms without
even producing a correspondingly material reduction in the housing
provider’s risk. The first step in such a scheme would be to ensure that
rental decisions are made using transparent criteria that are reasonably
related to predicting an applicant’s future performance as a tenant. The best
way to promote transparency would be for housing providers to establish
written, binding tenant-selection criteria and inform rejected applicants of
the reasons for denials or other adverse decisions. Practical legal remedies
for applicants who are rejected on grounds inconsistent with such written
policies could give teeth to such a requirement. A second tier of regulations
could then prohibit rental criteria lacking some minimal degree of
predictive value (as to the applicant’s future performance in a tenancy) or
criteria that conflicts with public policy goals—one of which must
eventually include ending homelessness.342
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screening reports that can contain misleading or inaccurate information with no recourse
to dispute their record.”); see also William Sermons, Meghan Henry & Mary
Cunningham, Homelessness Counts: Changes In Homelessness From 2005 to 2007,
NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, 21 (Jan. 2009),
http://www.endhomelessness.org/files/2158_file_counts_2_final.pdf (Demonstrating that
Washington was among states that had high rates of homelessness per capita in 2007)
[hereinafter Sermons, Henry & Cunningham].
5
See Grant, supra note 4 (“After every denial the tenant will pay for the same report from
another landlord, and the repeated costs can be staggering. At Solid Ground people have
contacted our agency with reports of having paid $300–400 in screening fees. One of our
families enrolled in our homelessness prevention program reported being denied 15 times
and paying over $800 in screening fees.”); see also Ben Jacklet, The Screening Scam,
THE STRANGER, 12 (Mar. 4–10, 1999), available at
http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/the-screening-scam/Content?oid=383.
6
See Tenant Screening Agencies in the Twin Cities: An Overview of Tenant Screening
Practices and their Impact on Renters, HOUSINGLINK, 40 (2004),
http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Tenant_Screening.pdf (“[T]he increasingly popular use
of tenant screening reports has resulted in a new class of people who are unable to access
rental housing because of past credit problems, evictions, poor rental histories or criminal
backgrounds.”) [hereinafter HOUSINGLINK].
7
See Sermons, Henry & Cunningham, supra note 4, 20–21.
8
As an illustrative example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) recommends that public housing agencies screen applicants to publiclysubsidized housing for “suitability,” which, though taking into account “all relevant
information,” especially focuses on “(1) An applicant's past performance in meeting
financial obligations, especially rent; (2) A record of disturbance of neighbors,
destruction of property, or living or housekeeping habits at prior residences which may
adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of other tenants; and (3) A history of
criminal activity involving crimes of physical violence to persons or property and other
criminal acts which would adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of other tenants.”
24 C.F.R. § 960.203(c) (2010).
9
Id.
10
See, e.g., Landlord Criteria Instructions, MYSCREENINGREPORT.COM,
http://www.myscreeningreport.com/MSR%20Landlord%20Criteria%20Instructions.pdf
(last visited Sept. 29, 2010) (from a Washington tenant-screening agency Moco, Inc.,
recommending that landlords distinguish between garnishable and nongarnishable
income in forming rental admissions policies).
11
See, e.g., Geibeler v. M & B Assoc., 343 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003).
12
See Minimum Criteria & Checklist For Tenant Selection, RENTAL HOUSING ASS’N,
http://www.rhaps.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Tenant_Screening_Test&Template=/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4893 (last visited Oct. 15, 2010); see also
MYSCREENINGREPORT.COM, supra note 10.
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13

See, e.g., Geibeler, 343 F.3d at 1145 (landlord may have an obligation to accept a cosigner for an applicant with disabilities who cannot meet minimum income requirements
due to their inability to work). But see Schanz v. Village Apts., 998 F. Supp. 784, 790
(E.D. Mich. 1998) (landlord had no duty to accept a guarantor agreement from a
nonprofit organization for an applicant with mental health disability).
14
Twelve states (California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin), the District of Columbia,
and numerous municipalities have enacted laws prohibiting housing discrimination on the
basis of a person’s lawful source of income. See Mencer v. Princeton Square Apts., 228
F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2000). However, a similar effort was unsuccessful in Washington.
H.R. 1766, 61st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009).
15
See Head v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., Inc., No. 05-80280-CIV, 2010 WL
3781288, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2010) (dismissing the fair housing claim because
“HUD guidelines unequivocally permit owners to reject applicants with a poor credit
history or with a debt to a prior landlord.”); Cotto v. Jenney, 721 F. Supp. 5, 6–7 (D.
Mass. 1989) (“report stating that a prospective tenant has fallen behind on its rent
payments on a prior occasion . . . would certainly give [landlord] pause before incurring a
potential financial risk by allowing the would-be tenant to occupy the residence.”); see,
e.g., Pasquince v. Brighton Arms Apts., 876 A.2d 834, 838–39 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005) (“it
is well established that creditworthiness is a legitimate, non-discriminatory criteria which
landlords are permitted to consider when evaluating prospective tenants”);
16
See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(c)(2) (2010) (“record of disturbance of neighbors,
destruction of property, or living or housekeeping habits at prior residences which may
adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of other tenants” may indicate a lack of
suitability for tenancy).
17
See, e.g., Mencer, 228 F.3d at 635 (“The record supports that the plaintiffs lacked
steady rental history and that their application interview with defendant revealed four
different addresses.”); Martha R. Burt, Life After Transitional Housing for Homeless
Families, 57 (Mar. 2010),
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1001375_transitional_housing.pdf (listing poor rental
history, bad credit, and criminal records among the most common barriers for formerly
homeless families seeking their own rental homes after graduation from transitional
housing); Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., 165 F.3d 642, 643 (8th Cir. 1999),
vacated, 191 F.3d 911 (1999), and rev’d in part en banc by an equally divided court, 206
F.3d 810 (2000).
18
See, e.g., Harrison v. Darby, No. 2:08-3874-PMD, 2009 WL 936469 (D. S.C. Apr. 7,
2009) (landlord declined to renew lease with tenant due to discovery of unspecified
“criminal record” on background check); State v. McEnry, 103 P.3d 857, 858–60 (Wash.
2004) (compelling circumstances to seal criminal conviction record did not exist because,
although it was “certainly possible that an employer or a landlord could review an
unsealed court file and see the record of a vacated conviction,” the defendant had stated
that the “potential loss of housing based on his court records was ‘not an issue’ because
he owns his home.”); Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1002–03 (D.
Minn. 2008) (discussing testimony by the director of a municipal building code
enforcement agency that, to improve neighborhood conditions, landlords should “screen
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their tenants [and] showing the ‘best’ tenants as those with the most income, best credit,
and least criminal history. The ‘bottom of the box’ tenants were those having poor credit
scores, criminal records, poor rental histories, and lower incomes.”), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part sub nom; Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010); Brett Theodos,
et al., Inclusive Public Housing: Services for the Hard to House, THE URBAN INST., 26
(Feb. 2010), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412035_inclusive_public_housing.pdf.
19
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 31 (“Overall, 72 percent of [housing providers
surveyed] stated that they use a tenant screening agency to screen potential renters. The
28 percent who responded that they do not use tenant-screening services were more likely
to be property managers who own or manage 10 units or [sic] less.”).
20
See id. (discussing specialized tenant-screening services). Compare, e.g., one of the
more prolific companies that conducts tenant-screening services in Washington is Kroll
Factual Data, which—in addition to tenant-screening services—also markets preemployment screening, financial credit reports, reports about businesses, and other
investigatory services. See KROLL, http://www.krollfactualdata.com/ (last visited Oct. 29,
2010).
21
Housing Search–Tenant Services, SOLID GROUND, http:/www.solidground.org/Tenant
/Pages/HousingSearch.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).
22
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) (2008) (“If a landlord uses a tenant screening
service, then the landlord may only charge for the costs incurred for using the tenant
screening service under this section. If a landlord conducts his or her own screening of
tenants, then the landlord may charge his or her actual costs in obtaining the background
information.”).
23
See Facts For Business, Using Consumer Reports: What Landlords Need to Know,
BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2 (Dec. 2001),
http://business.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/bus49-using-consumer-reports-whatlandlords-need-know.pdf; see also e.g., Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr.
2d 313, 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (agency typically provides its subscribers with
consumer reports consisting of a standard credit report, plus public record information
including any court records regarding evictions, property damage cases, rent cases,
foreclosures, and bankruptcies; the report may also contain information from its
subscribers concerning “good” tenants or “problem” tenants). For examples of typical
tenant-screening reports available in Washington, see ON-SITE.COM, http://www.onsite.com/qualify (last visited Sept. 29, 2010); ORCA INFO., http://www.orcainfocom.com/screening.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2010); Residential Screening, KROLL
FACTUAL DATA, http://www.krollfactualdata.com/services/resident-screening.aspx (last
visited Sept. 29, 2010).
24
See, e.g., Smart Leasing Tools, ON-SITE.COM, http://www.on-site.com/private_owners
(last visited Sept. 29, 2010); Residential Screening, MOCO, INC., http://
http://www.moco-inc.com/pages/tradService.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) (Moco, Inc.
offers “Instant Score-based Preliminary Recommendation”); RHA's Rent Right Decision
Model, RENTAL HOUS. ASS’N, http://www.rhaps.com/Content/NavigationMenu/TenantScreeningTest/RentRightDecisionModel/default.
htm (“there are three possible decisions: Approved, Approved with Conditions or
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Declined. With this type of report, you will not be able to view any credit details; you
will only be provided the decision based on credit. NOTE: if your applicant's credit
comes back "Declined," RHA will not be able to tell you why”) (emphasis in the
original); see also Miller v. Brookside at Summerville, L.L.C., 2008 WL 351338, at *2
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 11, 2008) (landlord “processed plaintiff’s application in
accordance with a screening procedure that uses a mathematical formula to assess an
applicant’s credit history, landlord-tenant history, income and criminal background.”).
25
See generally Trujillo v. First Am. Registry, Inc., 157 Cal. App. 4th 628 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (false information on rental application is a sufficient ground for rejection); State v.
McEnry, 103 P.3d 857 (Wash. 2004) (contemplating the prospect that the a person with a
vacated criminal conviction may be denied rental housing due to an appearance of nondisclosure or false information on the application).
26
See Anthony Rodriguez, Tenant-Screening Agencies Under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 39–40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 335, 336 (Sept.-Oct. 2005).
27
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (2006) and WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.010(4)(a) (2008)
for definitions of “consumer report.”
28
See Your Rights: Credit Reporting, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 13, 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/menus/consumer/credit/rights.shtm.
29
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 20 (“The four agencies interviewed for the survey
pull credit report information from one or more of the three main credit reporting
agencies, Equifax, Experian and TransUnion.”).
30
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2006) (“The term ‘consumer reporting agency’ means any
person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports to third parties…”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.010(5) (2008).
31
Credit bureau, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_bureau (last visited
Aug. 11, 2009).
32
See Your Credit Report, FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, 3,
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/consumer/creditreport.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
33
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.050(4).
34
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. pt. 600, App. § 4(E) Public Record Information (2010) (criminal
background is “information bearing on the consumer’s ‘personal characteristics’” for
purposes of Fair Credit Reporting Act).
35
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 20–21.
36
See Transition Paper for the Federal Trade Commission: It’s Time to Regulate the
Background Screening Industry, CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., INC., et. al, 8 (Dec. 9, 2008),
http://www.reentry.net/library/attachment.138696 (“What appears to be a recent growth
area for the commercial background screening industry is selling ‘50-state’ background
checks. In most cases, the screener appears to use criminal court databases which permit
matches by only name and date of birth.”) [hereinafter COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVICES];
see, e.g., Instant Nationwide Criminal Records Search, CRIM. RECORDS SEARCH,
http://www.criminal-records-search.com/nationwidecriminalrecords.htm (last visited Oct.
1, 2010); Criminal Background Checks, DIRECT SCREENING,
http://www.directscreening.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2010); Tenant Screening, E-
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RENTER.COM, http://www.e-renter.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2010); Nationwide Public
Records Search, MACDATA ADVANTAGE, http://www.macdataadvantage.com (last
visited Oct. 1, 2010); Products, TENANTAUTHORITY.COM,
http://www.tenantauthority.com/products.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
37
See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.090 (2008); Washington Access to Criminal History
(WATCH), http://watch.wsp.wa.gov/, (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
38
See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.97.050, 4.24.550 (2008). WATCH also contains
additional information, such as arrest records, but in a criminal history file that is not
open to general public. The Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs
provides a free online sex offender database that indicate the names of registered sexoffenders and classification levels.
http://www.waspc.org/index.php?c=Sex%20Offender%20Information (last visited Oct. 1,
2010). The Federal Bureau of Investigation also maintains a national sex offender
registry. http://www.nsopw.gov/Core/Conditions.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
39
See WATCH, supra note 37.
40
Id.
41
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(e) (2006) (regarding duties of persons who act as “resellers” of
consumer report).
42
See generally id.
43
See CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., supra note 36, at 4 (citing Nat’l Consortium for Justice
Info. & Statistics, Report of the National Task Force on the Commercial Sale of Criminal
Justice Record Information (2005)).
44
See 2 Wash. Prac. §15(b)(4) (“To seal means to protect from examination by the public
and unauthorized court personnel. A motion or order to delete, purge, remove, excise, or
erase, or redact shall be treated as a motion or order to seal.”)
45
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, 21–22.
46
FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 32, at 2.
47
Nonjudicial deed-of-trust foreclosures will nonetheless appear on a financial credit
report. Id.
48
See, e.g., Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., 165 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1999),
vacated, 191 F.3d 911 (1999), and rev’d in part en banc by an equally divided court, 206
F.3d 810 (2000) (rental collections and related proceedings in tenant-screening reports);
Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (UDR
typically provides its subscribers with . . . court records regarding evictions, property
damage cases, rent cases, foreclosures, and bankruptcies.”).
49
See, e.g., White v. First Am. Registry, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1611(LAK), 2007 WL 703926,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007) (“This lawsuit arises by reason of the nature of defendants'
business, which consists of selling landlords the opportunity to consult a list of
individuals who have been involved in landlord-tenant litigation.”); see Teri K. Rogers,
TIMES,
Nov.
26,
2006,
Only
the
Strongest
Survive,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/realestate/26cov.html (“It is the policy of 99 percent
of our customers in New York to flat out reject anybody with a landlord-tenant record, no
matter what the reason is and no matter what the outcome is, because if their dispute has
escalated to going to court, an owner will view them as a pain,” said Jake Harrington, a
founder of On-Site.com. “Renters are presumed litigious if they stopped paying rent to a
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slumlord or even if they acquired a court record by mistake.”); see also Miller v.
Brookside at Summerville, L.L.C., 2008 WL 351338, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Feb. 11, 2008) (declining to decide whether “defendant's application process, specifically
the erroneous use of lawsuit history, violates public policy.”); see also Schoendorf, 118
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 315 (Cal. App. 2002) (UDR also obtains information directly from its
subscribers concerning “good” tenants and “problem” tenants, and that information, too,
is included in a tenant's report.”).
50
See Sandra Park, Fair Housing for Domestic Violence Survivors, THE NAT’L L. CTR.
ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY (Nov. 13, 2008)
http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/ACLU_Park_Webinar_Gender_Discrimination.pdf.
51
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 35.
52
The term “unlawful detainer” comes from the Unlawful Detainer Act, an 1890 statute
establishing summary proceedings by which a landlord may recover possession of real
property from a holdover tenant. WASH. REV. CODE § 59.12.030 (2005).
53
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.12.050 (2005).
54
Superior Court Management Information System (SCOMIS), WASHINGTON STATE,
http://www.courts.wa.gov/jislink/?fa=jislink.scomis (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
55
Id.
56
Testimony of John Bell, Washington House Judiciary Committee, June 8, 2010,
available at
http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2010060031B&TYPE=V&CFID=781
0673&CFTOKEN=13413583&bhcp&bhcp=1.
57
See, e.g., HOUSINGLINK, supra 6, at 21–23 (“[T]he largest agency in the study uses
eviction data from 45 states and provides a list of all the names that come up during a
search . . . interviews with representatives from the four tenant screening agencies in the
study show that they are likely drawing from similar data sources. The methods of
reporting the data are also similar. The standard procedure is to report all criminal records
and eviction records that turn up from a search.”).
58
See accord White v. First Am. Registry, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1611(LAK), 2007 WL
703926, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007) (“The problem is compounded by the fact that the
information available . . . from the New York City Housing Court is sketchy in the best of
cases and inaccurate and incomplete in the worst.”).
59
See http://www.metrokc.gov/kcscc/copies.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2008) (“King
County Superior Court records filed after November 1, 2004, are now available online for
purchase and viewing. Currently we offer criminal, civil and probate cases . . . The fee is
$.10 per page, and an account is required.”).
60
See Mistakes Do Happen: A Look at Errors in Consumer Credit Reports, U.S. PIRG:
THE FED’N. OF STATE PIRGS, at 4 (2004),
http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/BEevuv19a3KzsATRbZMZlw/MistakesDoHa
ppen2004.pdf (“79% of the credit reports surveyed contained either serious errors or
other mistakes of some kind.”).
61
Candace Heckman, Study Assails Accuracy of Credit Reports, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, (June 21, 2004), available at
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/178825_creditscores21.asp.
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62

Scott Michels, Advocates Complain of Background Check Errors, ABC NEWS (Oct.
13, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=6017227&page=1.
63
See Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Revisiting Megan’s Law and Sex Offender
Registration: Prevention or Problem, AM. PROB. & PAROLE ASS’N, 4 (2000),
http://www.appa-net.org/eweb/docs/appa/pubs/RML.pdf (“Many states report that the
registered addresses are not updated [or are incorrect]. Many states post these on the
Internet, listing innocent people's addresses as those of convicted sex offenders.”); see
Radley Balko, Sex Flaws: Database Mistakes, CBS INTERACTIVE BUSINESS NETWORK
(Mar. 2008),
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1568/is_10_39/ai_n24966455/?tag=content;coll;
see Ryan Tracy, Sex Offender Registry Mistake Hits Home for Hamilton Family, N.J.
TIMES, (Mar. 7, 2009),
http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2009/03/sex_offender_registry_mistake.html; see
also HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 20.
64
HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 17 (“Tenant screening agencies typically evaluate
prospective renters using three types of data, including: (1) financial information pulled
from one or more of the three primary credit reporting agencies, (2) information pulled
from public records, including criminal data and court records and (3) verification of
personal information including social security numbers, employment and address
histories.”).
65
Id. at 36.
66
See Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (case in which tenantscreening company misinterpreted settlement agreement filed in unlawful detainer court
record “illustrates how important it is for Experian, a company that traffics in the
reputations of ordinary people, to train its employees to understand the legal significance
of the documents they rely on.”).
67
See CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., supra note 36, at 22.
68
Id. at 7–10.
69
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 24 (“The more identifiers that are attached to a
record, the easier it is for tenant screening agencies to access the information and provide
accurate information on an applicant.”); see CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., supra note 36, at 8.
70
See WASHINGTON STATE, supra note 54.
71
Testimony of Barbara Miner, King County Clerk, Washington House Judiciary
Committee, June 8, 2010, available at
http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2010060031B&TYPE=V&CFID=781
0673&CFTOKEN=13413583&bhcp&bhcp=1.
72
See WATCH, supra note 37 (“[We] cannot guarantee the records you obtain through
this site relate to the person on whom you are seeking information. Searches based on
names and other identifiers are not always accurate. The only way to positively link
someone to a criminal record is through fingerprint verification.”).
73
Case Number/Case Name Search - Terms and Conditions, SUPERIOR COURT
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM,
http://dw.courts.wa.gov/?fa=home.casesearchTerms (last visited Aug. 12, 2009).
74
CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., supra note 36, at 9.
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75

See White v. First Am. Registry, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1611(LAK), 2007 WL 703926, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007) (tenant screening company “defendants have seized upon the
ready and cheap availability of electronic records to create and market a product that can
be, and probably is, used to victimize blameless individuals . . . The fact that defendants
are willing, indeed anxious, to engage in activities that are bound to harm innocent people
is distressing.”); see also HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 23–25.
76
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 23–24.
77
See Trujillo v. First Am. Registry, Inc., 157 Cal. App.4th 628, 733–34 (Cal. Ct. app.
2007) (rental applicant who had prevailed in prior unlawful detainer action checked “no”
box on application asking if he had “ever had an unlawful detainer action filed against
[him]” rejected for misrepresentation on application); see also State v. McEnry, 103 P.3d
857, 859 (Wash. 2004) (contemplating the prospect that a person with a vacated criminal
conviction may be denied rental housing due to an appearance of non-disclosure or false
information on the application).
78
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.005 (1993).
79
15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(f) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.010(5) (1993).
80
15 U.S.C. § 1681(i) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE §19.182.090 (1993).
81
15 U.S.C. § 1681(i) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE §19.182.090 (1993).
82
15 U.S.C. § 1681(i) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE §19.182.090 (1993).
83
E-OSCAR, http://209.34.249.149/about.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
84
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(D) (1994) (“Any consumer-reporting agency that compiles and
maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis shall implement an automated system
through which furnishers of information to that consumer reporting agency may report
the results of a reinvestigation that finds incomplete or inaccurate information in a
consumer’s file to other such consumer reporting agencies.”).
85
Id.; see About E-OSCAR, EOSCAR, http://209.34.249.149/about.htm (last visited Oct.
5, 2010).
86
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(p) (2003); § 1681i(a)(5)(D) (1994).
87
§ 1681i(a)(5)(D) (1994); § 1681s(2) (1996) (discussing “furnisher duties”).
88
A Google search for “tenant screening Washington State” on Aug. 12, 2009, returned
52,000 hits, including links to more than forty websites of companies offering tenantscreening services in Washington. Some representative sites included:
www.infocubic.com, www.screeningworks.com, www.evictionrecords.com,
www.calleleanore.com, www.rentlaw.com, www.uslandlord.com, www.E-Renter.com,
www.megascreening.com, www.criminalbackgroundrecords.com,
www.landlord411.com, rentalexpress.com, www.TenantScreening.net ,
www.mypropertyguard.com, www.manta.com, www.cibackgrounds.com, and others.
Interestingly, this search did not turn up links to the websites of some of Washington’s
most prolific tenant-screening agencies, such as On-Site Manager, Inc., Orca
Information, Inc., or the Rental Housing Association of Puget Sound.
89
See accord Cox v. St. Owner, L.P., No. 114062/08, 2009 WL 2986667, at *2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 2009) (“The blacklisting effect that may result from [New York State
Office of Court Administration’s] practice of selling data to tenant screening bureaus
[TSBs] is a realistic concern for prospective tenants. . . Realizing that there are numerous
TSBs, this court acknowledges that prospective tenants are still faced with the possibility
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of being blacklisted when seeking accommodations.”); see also Fact Sheet 6b: ‘Other’
Consumer Reports: What You Should Know About Specialty Consumer Reports,
PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, §6 (Nov. 2008), http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6bSpecReports.htm (“Consumers may have a particularly difficult time exercising their
right to a free specialty report when the ‘specialty’ market is saturated with agencies.
This may prove to be the case for tenants who want to check their file.”).
90
See PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 89, at § 3 (“[consumer] ‘report’ is the
document provided to the employer, landlord, insurer or creditor. The report reflects
information collected and compiled at any given time. Your ‘file’ on the other hand is the
information the consumer reporting agency maintains about you. Your right to a free
disclosure is to your ‘file,’ not your ‘report.’).
91
See id.
92
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (1994) (Consumer Reporting Agency (CRA) must, on
request, “clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer: (1) All information in the
consumer’s file at the time of the request) (emphasis added); accord WASH. REV. CODE §
19.182.070 (1993).
93
See Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., 165 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1999).
94
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) (1991); see also WASH. REV. CODE §
19.182.110(2) (1993); 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(2)(A) (1996).
95
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(b) (1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.100(2) (1993).
96
See Wilson, 165 F.3d at 646 (“Because landlords need to fill units promptly, by the
time a tenant screening report is corrected, the unit is often rented.”).
97
See PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 89, §6. See generally Jacklet, supra
note 5.
98
See Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v.
Colonial Bank, 826 F. Supp. 415, 418 (M.D.Ala. 1993) (“A credit reporting agency has
no duty, as a part of its reinvestigation, to go behind public records to check for accuracy
or completeness when a consumer is essentially collaterally attacking the underlying
credit information.”)). But see Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 287–88 (7th
Cir. 1994) (“[A] credit reporting agency may initially rely on public court documents,
because to require otherwise would be burdensome and inefficient. However, such
exclusive reliance may not be justified once the credit reporting agency receives notice
that the consumer disputes information contained in his credit report. When a credit
reporting agency receives such notice, it can target its resources in a more efficient
manner and conduct a more thorough investigation.”).
99
See Jacklet, supra note 5 (“tenants often pay for three or four (supposedly) different
credit checks each time they move); see BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE
COMM’N, supra note 23, at 2; see also Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr.
2d 313, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“UDR typically provides its subscribers with consumer
reports consisting of a standard credit report from one or more of the three major credit
bureaus (Trans Union, Experian, and Equifax) and public record information that is
gathered by its own employees from a review of court records regarding evictions,
property damage cases, rent cases, foreclosures, and bankruptcies.”).
100
Testimony of Jonathan Grant, Washington House Committee on Financial Institution
&
Insurance
Regarding HB
2622
(Jan.
25,
2010), available at
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http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2010010115&TYPE=V&CFID=9447
68&CFTOKEN=55618456&bhcp=1.
101
See note for Grant, supra note 4. See generally Jacklet, supra note 5.
102
See generally Jacklet, supra note 5.
103
See generally id.
104
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) (1991) (stating that landlord may charge actual
costs of obtaining background information about prospective tenants, whether from a
screening service or through the landlord’s own activities).
105
See Claudia Coulton, Brett Theodos, & Margery A. Turner, Family Mobility and
Neighborhood Change: New Evidence and Implications for Community Initiatives,
URBAN INST., 20–23 (Nov. 2009),
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411973_family_mobility.pdf (discussing patterns of
family relocation in the White Center neighborhood of Seattle as a possible “comfort
zone” for low-income families); see also Rogers, supra note 49 (quoting leasing
professionals who recommend that renters with blemished credit or rental history seek
housing from “less-selective” landlords).
106
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 18 (“screening agencies also use statistical scoring
models which predict future financial risk based upon characteristics of their past
behavior.”).
107
See generally RENTAL HOUS. ASS’N, supra note 24.
108
Id.
109
See Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., 165 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1999)
(“Landlords have little incentive to verify ‘possible’ negative information, since they
have the option of simply choosing another prospective tenant who has no negative
information.”). See generally Rogers, supra note 49 (“Landlords can afford to be picky,
because vacancy rates have lurked beneath 1 percent for a year.”). See also
HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 12 (“An extremely tight rental market in the Twin Cities
exacerbated the issues cited in the analysis of impediments.”).
110
See also U.D. Registry, Inc. v. State, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal. App. 4th, 1995)
(discussing legislative findings in support of California statute which provided that
“inappropriate inclusion of information about unlawful detainer actions results in ‘tenant
blacklisting’ and imposes an unfair and unnecessary hardship on tenants seeking rental
housing” and quoting report of the California Senate Committee on Judiciary regarding
AB 1796 of 1991) [hereinafter U.D. Registry Div. 4]; see White v. First Am. Registry,
Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1611(LAK), 2007 WL 703926, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007) (“This
lawsuit arises by reason of the nature of defendants' business, which consists of selling
landlords the opportunity to consult a list of individuals who have been involved in
landlord-tenant litigation. As defendants doubtless well understand, risk averse landlords
are all too willing to use defendants' product as a blacklist, refusing to rent to anyone
whose name appears on it regardless of whether the existence of a litigation history in
fact evidences characteristics that would make one an undesirable tenant.”); see also
Gary Williams, Can Government Limit Tenant Blacklisting?, 24 SW. U.L. REV. 1077,
1080 (1995) (“Today landlords refuse to rent to persons identified as defendants in
unlawful detainer actions, regardless of the outcome of the litigation.”) (citing Barela v.
Superior Court, 636 P.2d 582, 583 (Cal. 1981)).
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111

See U.D. Registry Div. 4, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 231; Pultz v. Economakis, No.
114915/2004, 2005 WL 1845635, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2005); Wallace Oman, The
Need for Masking Court Unlawful Detainer Records, S.F. APT. MAG. (July 2008),
http://www.sfaa.org/july2008/0807oman.html.
112
See, e.g., Save Harlem v. Pinnacle Grp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 499, 504 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(discussing claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (1970), that property management enterprise “create[d] a climate of fear and
intimidation aimed at making tenants afraid to exercise their legal rights or object to
defendants’ conduct by (1) using the existence of ‘blacklisting’ . . . ‘a practice where
commercial tenant screening bureaus purchase electronic housing court case data[,] use
this data to prepare so-called ‘tenant screening reports’ based on that data, and then sell
such reports to prospective landlords.”).
113
See Testimony of Jonathan Grant, supra note 100; see generally Brief of Amicus
Curiae Solid Ground, Indigo Real Estate Servs. v. Rousey, 215 P.3d 977 (Wash. Ct. App.
2009) (“Many of our clients who are housed report to Solid Ground housing counselors
that they are not able to assert their rights because the landlord threatens to file an
eviction lawsuit against them. Tenants cannot realistically access their legal remedies or
assert other rights for fear of this type of retaliation . . . . Many renters report to me that if
they move out before the filing, at least they will have a clean record to seek housing
later.”); see also Regina Wagner, et al., Regional Analysis of Impediments to Fair
Housing, WASHINGTON COUNTY, at 160 (May 2001),
http://www.co.washington.mn.us/client_files/documents/css/CSS_CDBG/CSS-2001_Analysis_of_Impediments.pdf (“The negative impact of an eviction is so great that
many tenants have become increasingly reluctant to enforce any of their rights for fear
that an owner will retaliate and file an eviction proceeding, which would impact their
housing choices for the next seven years.”).
114
See accord Pultz, 2005 WL 1845635, at *7 (granting preliminary injunction to stop
landlords from filing unlawful detainer actions against tenants in part because “there are
now various credit agencies whose primary business is to report to landlord subscribers,
the names of all tenants who have appeared in the computer indices of Housing Court, no
matter whether they were the petitioner or respondent and without regard to whether they
were successful in their proceedings. This ‘blacklist’ makes the finding of a rental
apartment potentially very difficult if not impossible . . .As plaintiffs are tenants of
relatively modest means, the possibility of winding up on a blacklist should they
ultimately lose, would be devastating.”).
115
Id. In Washington, the superior court rules enable a landlord to commence an unlawful
detainer action by service of an unfiled summons and complaint. See WASH. CR 3(a) (“a
civil action is commenced by service of a copy of a summons together with a copy of a
complaint . . . or by filing a complaint.”) (emphasis added). The complaint need only be
filed if the defendant responds to the summons.
116
See Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to
Protect Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1363 (2007); see also Rogers, supra note 49
(“‘if their dispute has escalated to going to court, an owner will view them as a pain,’ said
Jake Harrington, a founder of On-Site.com.”).
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117

See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240 (2010) (“So long as the tenant is in compliance
with [the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (RLTA)], the landlord shall not take or
threaten to take reprisals or retaliatory action against the tenant because of any good faith
and lawful: (1) Complaints or reports by the tenant to a governmental authority
concerning the failure of the landlord to substantially comply with any code, statute,
ordinance, or regulation governing the maintenance or operation of the premises, if such
condition may endanger or impair the health or safety of the tenant; or (2) Assertions or
enforcement by the tenant of his rights and remedies under [the RLTA].”).
118
See generally B.R.U.S.H. v. Pinnacle Grp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 499, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
119
See generally White v. First Am. Registry, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1611(LAK), 2007 WL
703926 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007); Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d
313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6. See Testimony of Jonathan Grant,
supra note 100.
120
See Rogers, supra note 49.
121
See generally Testimony of Jonathan Grant, supra note 100.
122
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 40 (“the increasingly popular use of tenant
screening reports has resulted in a new class of people who are unable to access rental
housing because of past credit problems, evictions, poor rental histories or criminal
backgrounds.”); see also Pultz v. Economakis, No. 114915/2004, 2005 WL 1845635, at
*7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2005) (“This ‘blacklist’ potentially makes the finding of a
rental apartment potentially very difficult if not impossible.”).
123
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 7 (emphasis added).
124
See Testimony of Jonathan Grant, supra note 100 (“The creation of a permanent
eviction record made publicly available on the SCOMIS database is one of the primary
reasons why many of our clients are denied housing and their homelessness is
perpetuated.”).
125
See Carlile v. Harbor Homes, Inc., 194 P.3d 280, 290–91 (Wash. App. 2008) (“The
duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract [and] requires only that the
parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement.”).
126
See generally Simon v. D. Miller & Assoc., P.L.L.C., No. 14-07-00894-CV, 2009 WL
335068 (Tex. App. Feb. 12, 2009) (discussing legal malpractice action against attorney
whose procedural errors led to dismissal of plaintiff’s claim that his application to rent an
apartment had been “improperly [sic] rejected for lack of a current W–2 form after he
was told by a leasing agent that the lack of a W–2 would not cause a problem.”). See also
Collard v. Reagan, No. 26410-2-II, 2002 WL 1357052, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. June 21,
2002).
127
See generally Riss v. Angel, 934 P.2d 669, 680 (Wash. 1997) (party’s rejection of
another’s performance under a satisfaction contract will be upheld only if the decision is
reasonable and made in good faith).
128
See Crafts v. Pitts, 162 P.3d 382, 386–88 (Wash. 2007) (“No piece of land has its
counterpart anywhere else and it is impossible to duplicate by the expenditure of any
amount of money” (quoting Carpenter v. Folkerts, 627 P.2d 559, 561 (Wash. Ct. App.
1981)).
129
See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.110 (1993); see also WASH. REV. CODE §
59.18.257(3) (1991). But see 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(b) (1996) (Establishing that if the

VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010

384 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

source of the information that leads to a rejection is a person other than a CRA, then the
FCRA requires the landlord to inform the denied applicant of the right to obtain the
reason for denial. On request of the applicant, landlord must also inform the applicant of
the right to learn the reason for denial at the time the denial is communicated to the
applicant).
130
Id.
131
See generally HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 39–40.
132
Cf. Egbert v. Way, 546 P.2d 1246, 1248–49 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (“[D]enial of
specific performance is proper where enforcement is unreasonably difficult or would
require such long continued supervision by the court as is disproportionate to the
advantages to be gained.”).
133
See Crafts, 162 P.3d at 387.
134
Weissman v. Safeco Ins. Co., 236 P.3d 240, 242 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (“Under the
American rule on fees in civil cases, which Washington follows, civil litigants are
responsible for paying their own attorney fees and costs absent specific statutory
authority, contractual provision, or recognized grounds in equity” (citing Wagner v.
Foote, 908 P.2d 884, 888 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)).
135
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.430 (1973) (“All provisions of [RLTA] shall apply to any
lease or periodic tenancy entered into on or subsequent to July 16, 1973.”).
136
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.580(1) (2004) (“A landlord may not . . . refuse to enter into
a rental agreement based on the tenant's or applicant's or a household member's status as
a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.”).
137
Stephanus v. Anderson, 613 P.2d 533, 537 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (duty of good faith
did not preclude retaliatory eviction of tenant). But see Ethridge v. Hwang, 20 P.3d 958,
962–64 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (mobile home park’s refusal, “on idiosyncratic, frivolous,
unreasonable, and unlawful grounds” to permit sale of mobile home to prospective buyer
be actionable under Mobile Home Landlord Tenant Act duty of good faith).
138
See, e.g., Truly v. Hueft, 158 P.3d 1276, 1281 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). But see Carlile,
194 P.3d at 290–91 (stating that the duty of good faith does not “inject substantive terms
into the parties' contract.”).
139
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1961) (“Unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawful.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1961) (remedies).
140
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (2009).
141
See generally Allen v. Am. Land Research, 631 P.2d 930 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
142
See Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co., 204 P.3d 885, 889–90 (Wash. 2009).
143
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2009).
144
Cotton v. Kronenberg, 44 P.3d 878, 886 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (whether a practice
“impacts the public interest” is usually also a question of fact, but generally turns on
factors like whether the acts took place in the course of the defendant’s business, whether
the defendant advertised to the general public, whether the defendant actively solicited
the plaintiff or others, and whether the defendant occupied a superior bargaining position
to the plaintiff).
145
State v. Schwab, 693 P.2d 108, 110 (Wash. 1985) (“Residential landlord-tenant
problems are within the express purview of the [RLTA] and we perceive the legislature's
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intent to clearly be that violations of that act do not also constitute violations of the
Consumer Protection Act.”).
146
Id. at 113–15. Since Schwab precludes enforcement of the RLTA via the CPA, it is
fairly certain that a rental applicant cannot invoke the CPA remedies clause to enforce a
violation of the RLTA duty of good faith under the per se doctrine.
147
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.030(13) (1973) (defining “tenant”); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 59.18.060 (1973) (duties of landlords); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.130 (1973) (duties
of tenants).
148
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.253, 257 (1991).
149
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.253 (1991) (“Deposit to secure occupancy by tenant—
Landlord's duties—Violation”).
150
See id. (“Deposit to secure occupancy by tenant—Landlord's duties—Violation”).
151
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.253 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257 (1991);
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.570 (2004).
152
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.253(3) (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(4)
(1991).
153
Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 191 P.2d 858, 863–64 (Wash. 1948) (“[I]n enacting
legislation upon a particular subject, the lawmaking body is presumed to be familiar not
only with its own prior legislation relating to that subject, but also with the court
decisions construing such former legislation.”).
154
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.253, c 194 § 2 (1991) (“The legislature finds that
tenant application fees often have the effect of excluding low-income people from
applying for housing because many low-income people cannot afford these fees in
addition to the rent and other deposits which may be required. The legislature further
finds that application fees are frequently not returned to unsuccessful applicants for
housing, which creates a hardship on low-income people.”).
155
See id.
156
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.580(1) (2004).
157
Id.
158
Id. at § 59.18.580(2).
159
Id.
160
See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(3) (2010).
161
See Collard v. Reagan, No. 26410-2-II, 2002 WL 1357052, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App.
June 21, 2002) (plaintiffs and “[s]everal other witnesses also testified at trial regarding
their dealings with Reagan. They related almost identical stories: seeing a newspaper
advertisement for a rental house; contacting Reagan and completing an application;
paying the credit check fee; Reagan's calling to say that they were approved and that they
needed to pay a deposit; submitting the deposit; and Reagan's refusing to rent the house
or refund the deposit.”).
162
Id. at *3 (“By not apprising the trial court that the complaint potentially alleged a
violation of the wrong statute and instead defending under the CPA, Reagan waived his
right to assert later that the CPA was not the proper statute to apply.”).
163
See Ethridge v. Hwang, 20 P.3d 958, 965 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
164
Id. at 964; see also Holiday Park Cmty. Ass’n v. Echo Lake Assocs., L.L.C., 135 P.3d
499, 503 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding mobile home park tenant organization and
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individual mobile home park owners had standing to bring CPA action against park
management).
165
See Eifler v. Shurgard Capital, 861 P.2d 1071, 1078 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
166
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2010).
167
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.222 (2010) (“Unfair practices with respect to real
estate transactions, facilities, or services”).
168
SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE § 14.08.010–215 (2010).
169
TACOMA MUNICIPAL CODE § 1.29.100 (2010) (“Unlawful discriminatory housing
practices.”).
170
See generally Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding tenants
of apartment complex who alleged they lost benefits of living in an integrated community
because of landlord's discrimination against nonwhites had standing to sue under Fair
Housing Act).
171
See, e.g., Children’s Alliance v. City of Bellevue, 950 F. Supp. 1491, 1495 (W.D. Wa.
1997); see also Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1978).
172
John Relman, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL, §2:23, at 2–68 (Oct.
2008) (“This type of evidence is rare, for the simple reason that ‘most persons will not
readily admit publicly that they entertain any bias or prejudice against members of
[protected classes].’”) (quoting U.S. v. Real Estate Development Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776,
783 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
173
See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.110(1) (2010) (describing limits of written notice
requirements under the fair credit reporting act); see also WASH. REV. CODE §
59.18.257(3) (2010) (describing extent of notice landlord must give to prospective
tenant).
174
See generally Antonio v. Ward’s Cove Packing Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 1477, 1480 (9th
Cir. 1987) (discussing process for bringing a prima facie disparate treatment claim in the
employment context).
175
See Blomgren v. Ogle, 850 F. Supp. 1427, 1437 (E.D. Wa. 1993) (citing Tex. Dept. of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981)).
176
See id.
177
Id.
178
See, e.g., Pasquince v. Brighton Arms Apts., 876 A.2d 834, 838–39 (N.J. Super. Ct.
2005) (“it is well established that creditworthiness is a legitimate, non-discriminatory
criteria which landlords are permitted to consider when evaluating prospective tenants”);
Head v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., Inc., No. 05-80280-CIV, 2010 WL 3781288
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2010) (dismissing fair housing claim because “HUD guidelines
unequivocally permit owners to reject applicants with a poor credit history or with a debt
to a prior landlord.”); see Cotto v. Jenney, 721 F. Supp. 5, 6–7 (D. Mass. 1989) (“report
stating that a prospective tenant has fallen behind on its rent payments on a prior occasion
. . . would certainly give [landlord] pause before incurring a potential financial risk by
allowing the would-be tenant to occupy the residence.”).
179
Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (quoting Palmer v. U.S.,
794 F.2d 534, 538–39) (9th Cir. 1986).
180
Id. at 745–46; see also Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir.
1997).
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181

See Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 747 (discussing Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1254 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also Oliver v. Pac. Nw.
Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 724 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Wash. 1986) (applying the “business necessity”
standard to disparate impact claims in Washington State).
182
See Oliver, 724 P.2d at 1006; see also Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290,
1292–93 (8th Cir. 1975) (describing one company’s absolute policy of denying
employment to anyone convicted with a crime).
183
According to the U.S. Census in 2000, 12.9 percent of the U.S. population was
African American. The Black Population: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 2001),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-5.pdf. Yet throughout the country, 27
percent of all persons arrested in 2003 were African American. Crime in the United
States – 2003, Section IV – Persons Arrested FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (2003),
http://www.fbi.gov/filelink.html?file=/ucr/cius_03/pdf/03sec4.pdf. Of all persons arrested
that year for drug-related offenses, 32.6 percent were African American. Arrests,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, (2003),
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t4102003.pdf. African Americans represent a
greatly disproportionate 45 percent of the U.S. prison population. In all, an African
American person in 2000 was 8.2 times more likely to be incarcerated than a Caucasian
person. See Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (MAY 2000),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/Rcedrg00-01.htm#P167_28183.
184
See Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship, 56 F.3d at 1254. The seminal case
concerning the disparate impact of criminal records on rental applicants is Talley v. Lane,
13 F.3d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir. 1994), which upheld the Chicago Housing Authority’s use
of HUD-prescribed selection criteria for public housing tenants that excluded
“individuals with a history of convictions for property and assaultive crimes [who] would
be a direct threat to other tenants[.]”). See also Evans v. UDR, Inc., 644 F. Supp.2d 675,
694 (E.D. N.C. 2009) (applicant denied under rental policy providing that “[t]he
application or occupancy of any person may be denied at any time based on their criminal
history, in Management's sole and absolute discretion,” but where policy also provided
that denials for criminal history would be made on a case-by-case basis and limited to
crimes involving physical violence, property damage, or fraud). But see generally
Harrison v. Darby, No. 2:08-3874-PMD, , 2009 WL 936469, at *1–6 (D. S.C. Apr. 7,
2009) (landlord declined to renew lease with tenant due to discovery of unspecified
“criminal record” on background check).
185
See, e.g., Oliver, 724 P.2d at 1006–07 (employer’s policy of taking disciplinary action
against employees based on “dishonest acts committed outside of employment” held not
to cause a disparate impact African Americans, who were statistically more likely to be
arrested for property crimes such as theft, because rather than “a flat rule which requires
automatic termination resulting from commission of a dishonest act, [the employer]
addresse[d] each specific situation regarding a violation of the standards of conduct on a
case-by-case basis, and ultimate disciplinary action depend[ed] on a variety of factors.”).
186
See Green v. Sunpointe Assocs., Ltd., 1997 WL 1526484 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (holding
that landlord’s policy of refusing to participate in voluntary Section 8 voucher program
would cause a disparate impact against a protected racial group); accord., Montgomery
County v. Glenmont Hills, 936 A.2d 325 (Md. App. Ct. 2007) (upholding Maryland
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statute prohibiting discrimination on basis of lawful source of income); Franklin Tower
One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1112 (N.J. 1999) (holding that a landlord's refusal
to accept a Section 8 voucher violates New Jersey statute to the detriment of low-income
tenants); but cf. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apts., 136 F.3d 293, 302 (2nd Cir.
1998) (holding by a 2–1 decision that a landlord could not be required to accept Section 8
vouchers even if refusal would cause a disparate impact on a protected class).
187
See generally Giebeler v. M & B Assocs. Inc., 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that landlord must accept applicant’s co-signer as reasonable accommodation for
applicant’s disability that affected his ability to gain employment).
188
See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1557–58 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
189
See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding policy of
automatically denying parole to prisoners with substance abuse histories violated Title II
of ADA); Green, 523 F.2d at 1298 (holding employer’s policy of excluding from
employment any person convicted of a crime even if remote in time or relevance was
overly harsh and not justified by “business necessity”); Oliver, 724 P.2d at 1006 (finding
plaintiff employee could not bring disparate impact claim against company policy
requiring employees not to commit criminal acts because policy used subjective criteria
that were not facially neutral).
190
See RHA's Rent Right Decision Model, supra note 24.
191
See Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 746.
192
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 40 (“Numerous studies have shown that those
who are evicted are typically poor, women, and minorities.”).
193
See Eric Eckholm, A Sight All Too Familiar in Poor Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19evict.html.
194
See Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting that a party can establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by
demonstrating the following elements: “(1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral
practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a
particular type produced by the defendant's facially neutral acts or practices.” (quoting
Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1986).
195
See Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A prima facie case of
disparate impact is ‘usually accomplished by statistical evidence showing ‘that an
employment practice selects members of a protected class in a proportion smaller than
their percentage in the pool of actual applicants.’ Although statistical data alone, in a
proper case, may be adequate to prove causation, the “statistical disparities must be
sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of causation.”) (quoting
Robinson v. Adams, 847 F.2d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1988) and Ward’s Cove Packing Co.,
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989)).
196
See John P. Relman, 1 HOUSING DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL, § 2:26 (Oct.
2008) (“Courts of appeals have held that if a defendant’s action has the effect of
perpetuating segregation ‘and thereby prevents interracial association[,] it will be
considered invidious under the Fair Housing Act independently of the extent to which it
produces a disparate effect on different racial groups.’” (quoting Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977)).
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197

For this reason, fair housing laws typically prohibit landlords not only from applying
discriminatory tenant-selection policies to received applications, but also from merely
describing or advertising discriminatory selection policies. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(2010) (“[I]t shall be unlawful . . . (c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made,
printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or
rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE §
49.60.222(1)(g) (2007).
198
In this example, for instance, a theoretical plaintiff would need to meet the following
criteria to establish standing to sue: (i) the tenant would need to have applied for housing
at a residence and paid a screening fee; (ii) the housing provider would need to have
obtained a tenant-screening report; (iii) the housing provider would need to have denied
the application; (iv) the tenant would next have to obtain a copy of the screening report;
(v) the tenant would then need to promptly apply for subsequent rental; (vi) the tenant
would have to request that the new housing provider review the tenant’s (alreadyobtained) screening report in lieu of charging the tenant the cost of obtaining a new one;
and (vii) the landlord would need to deny the request. Cf. Lake Valley Assocs., LLC v.
Township of Pemberton, 987 A.2d 623, 625 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (upholding
municipal zoning ordinance requiring landlords to “conduct tenant screening for new
occupants [including] a check for activity in the landlord/tenant section of the Special
Civil Part of the Superior Court; Municipal Court convictions for the past [three] years;
and convictions for offenses in the Superior Court for a period of [three] years.”).
199
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) (2010).
200
Id. at § 59.18.257(2) (2010).
201
Id. at § 59.18.257(4) (2010) (emphasis added).
202
See id. at § 59.18.257(2) (2010); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2010); WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.182.090 (2010); see also 2010 Wash. Legis. Serv. 194 (West) (“The
legislature also finds that it is important to both landlords and tenants that consumer
information concerning prospective tenants is accurate. Many tenants are unaware of
their rights under federal fair credit reporting laws to dispute information that may be
inaccurate. The legislature therefore finds and declares that it is the policy of the state for
prospective tenants to be informed of their rights to dispute information they feel is
inaccurate in order to help prevent denials of housing based upon incorrect information.”)
(amending WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.110 (2009)).
203
The right to dispute information with furnishers was established in 2003 as part of the
Fair and Accurate Transactions Act (FACTA) amendments to the federal FCRA. See 15
U.S.C. § 1681s–2(a)(8) (2010).
204
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2010); WASH. REV.
CODE § 59.18.253 (1991 c. 194) (“The legislature also finds that it is important to both
landlords and tenants that consumer information concerning prospective tenants is
accurate. Many tenants are unaware of their rights under federal fair credit reporting laws
to dispute information that may be inaccurate. The legislature therefore finds and declares
that it is the policy of the state for prospective tenants to be informed of their rights to
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dispute information they feel is inaccurate in order to help prevent denials of housing
based upon incorrect information.”).
205
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) (2010).
206
See Truly v. Heuft, 158 P.3d 1276, 1281 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that a court
interpreting a statute “must consider the statute as a whole and avoid rendering any
section meaningless or superfluous.”).
207
Such duties now pertain under the federal FCRA to certain “furnishers” who provide
information to consumer reporting agencies. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(a)(8) (2005).
However, no such furnisher duties existed prior to the 2003 enactment of FACTA. As
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) was enacted in 1991, the applicant’s “right to dispute
the accuracy of information provided by the . . . entities listed on the tenant application”
could not be a reference to a consumer’s right to dispute information with furnishers
under the federal FCRA. See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) (2010).
208
1991 Wash. Legis. Serv. 194 § 1 (West); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.253
(2010).
209
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) (2010).
210
Id. at § 59.18.020 (2010).
211
Id. at § 59.18.257 (2010). Curiously, an original version of House Bill 1336 of 1991,
the bill which later became WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257 (2010), defined “tenantscreening service” as “a consumer reporting agency as defined in WASH. REV. CODE §
59.18.240,” and would have amended WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240 to define “credit
reporting agency” in the virtually the same way as “consumer reporting agency” is
defined in the FCRA. 1991 Wash. Legis. Serv. 194 (West) (“credit reporting agency
means any person who, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis,
regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties”); see also WASH. REV. CODE §
19.182.020(5) (2010). The apparent reason for defining “credit reporting agency” in
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240, however, was a separate portion of HB 1336 that would
have prohibited a landlord from making a report to a consumer reporting agency about a
tenant as a reprisal for a tenant’s good faith and lawful act. See 1991 Wash. Legis. Serv.
194 § 3(2)(e) (West). This provision was later removed, along with the definitions for
both “credit reporting agency” and “tenant screening service,” so the resulting legislation
contains no definition for “tenant-screening service.” 1991 Wash. Legis. Serv. 194 § 1
(West).
212
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.010(5) (2010).
213
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) (2010).
214
Id.
215
One exception is myscreeningreport.com, a tenant-screening report that Moco, Inc.,
will prepare at the request of a consumer. This product can enable rental applicants to
avoid successive application charges, provided the housing providers (to whom the
SCREENING
REP.,
applicant
applies)
accept
the
report.
MY
http://www.myscreeningreport.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
216
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (2010); Wash. Rev. Code § 19.182.070 (2010).
217
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(b) (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.100(2) (2010); see also
§ 19.182.010(1)(a)(iv) (2010) (defining adverse action as “[a]ction or determination with
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respect to a consumer's application for the rental or leasing of residential real estate that is
adverse to the interests of the consumer”); 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k) (2010) (defining
“adverse action”).
218
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) (2010) (“If a landlord uses a tenant screening
service, then the landlord may only charge for the costs incurred for using the tenant
screening service.”).
219
Id.
220
See id.; H.B. 1336, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. at § 1; WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1)
(1991) (“The legislature finds that tenant application fees often have the effect of
excluding low-income people from applying for housing because many low-income
people cannot afford these fees in addition to the rent and other deposits which may be
required. The legislature further finds that application fees are frequently not returned to
unsuccessful applicants for housing, which creates a hardship on low-income people. . . .
[T]herefore . . . it is the policy of the state that certain tenant application fees should be
prohibited and guidelines should be established for the imposition of other tenant
application fees.”).
221
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(w) (2010).
222
See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257 (2010).
223
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (d), (f) (defining “consumer report” and “consumer reporting
agency”). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.010(4)–(5) (defining “consumer report”
and “consumer reporting agency”). See Wilson, 165 F.3d at 643 (“Rental Research is a
credit reporting agency that provides information about prospective tenants to subscribing
landlords . . . . In a typical transaction, the subscriber submits the name, current and
former addresses, date of birth, and social security number of the prospective tenant to
Rental Research and asks for an ‘Instant Inquiry’ report. At the time in question, an
‘Instant Inquiry’ report cost $15. For an additional $14, landlords could also receive a
‘Verified Completion Report’ (VCR) which, according to Rental Research, reports only
confirmed information. In preparing an ‘Instant Inquiry’ report, Rental Research relies on
information compiled from multiple databases, including housing court unlawful detainer
records in Minnesota, western Wisconsin, and eastern North Dakota and credit reports
from national credit reporting agencies such as TRW, Inc.”). See also Weisent v.
Subaqua Corp., No. 102108/07, 2007 WL 2140947 at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)
(“[C]ompanies known as ‘tenant-screening bureaus’ (‘TSBs’) . . . prepare tenantscreening reports which they then sell to other companies and to prospective landlords.”).
224
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1997) (“Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”).
225
See Dennis, 520 F.3d at 1069 (applying federal FCRA to a credit report agency in a
suit filed by a tenant.).
226
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1997); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.060(2) (2010)
(Washington Fair Credit Reporting Act with identical language).
227
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(e) (1997) (establishing the same duty for resellers to follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy, but fulfill this duty when
they resell an accurate copy of a current report obtained from a third-party CRA.). But cf.
Lewis v. Ohio Prof’l Elec. Network, L.L.C., 248 F.Supp.2d 693, 698 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
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(stating that “[a]lthough § 1681e(e)(2)(A) uses the term ‘reasonable procedures,’ it does
not incorporate the same requirements as §1681e(b).”).
228
See Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995).
229
See Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 368 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Thompson
v. San Antonio Retail Merch. Ass’n, 682 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982)). See also Bryant
v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 78 (6th Cir. 1982).
230
Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333.
231
See CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING, (Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr.,
6th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2008 at § 4.4.5.1.2) (citing Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d
957 (3rd Cir. 1996)); cf. Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Alexander v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 948, 952 (D. Haw. 1982); Wilson v.
CARCO Grp., Inc., 518 F.3d 40, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
232
See CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., supra note 231, at 26 (citing FAIR CREDIT
REPORTING ACT § 1681(n) (1977) (Compliance)).
233
See Testimony of Jonathan Grant, supra note 100.
234
See Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (“When conducting a
reinvestigation pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681i, a credit reporting agency must exercise
reasonable diligence in examining the court file to determine whether an adverse
judgment has, in fact, been entered against the consumer.”).
235
See id.
236
See id.
237
See id.
238
See Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 321–22 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
239
Ordering records remotely can take several days or even weeks, a timeline
incommensurate with that of landlords seeking to make rapid rental decisions. Wilson,
165 F.3d at 646.
240
See Dennis, 520 F.3d at 1071.
241
See Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., 165 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The
importance of housing and the nature of the rental housing market intensify the damage
done to consumers who are the victims of an inaccurate report.”). See also Weisent v.
Subaqua Corp., No. 102108/07, 2007 WL 2140947 at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (filing
unlawful detainer action against person claiming right of succession to rent-controlled
apartment would cause a tenant irreparable harm because “regardless whether or not a
tenant prevails in the Housing Court, his or her name may appear on the blacklist, making
“the finding of a rental apartment potentially very difficult if not impossible, particularly
for a tenant of relatively modest means.”) (quoting Pultz v. Economakis, No.
114915/2004, 2005 WL 1845635, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2005).
242
See Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 368 (5th Cir. 2001). See also Dennis,
520 F.3d at 1071.
243
See Wilson, 165 F.3d at 647.
244
Ordering records remotely can take several days or even weeks, a timeline
incommensurate with that of landlords seeking to make rapid rental decisions. See
Wilson, 165 F.3d at 646.
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245

See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) (2010) (The King County Superior Court
charges a per-page fee to view case records online, but the fee is modest ($.10 per page)
and can be entirely passed along to the landlord, which may pass the charge along to the
applicant.). Cf. Dennis, 520 F.3d at 1071 (“Experian could have caught Hogan's error if it
had consulted the Civil Register in Dennis's case, which can be viewed free of charge on
the Los Angeles Superior Court's excellent website.”).
246
See WASH. REV. CODE §10.97.040 (2010).
247
See WASH. REV. CODE §59.18.410 (2010).
248
Although the statutory duty not to report unverifiable information technically does not
arise until a consumer has disputed an item, the FCRAs generally establish that
unverified information—even if true—may not be reported. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5).
See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.090 (1993). See also F.T.C. v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 1035
(9th Cir. 2001) (consumer reporting agency must delete unverifiable information from a
credit report). See also Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 287 (7th Cir. 1994)
(CRA acquires duty to look beyond original source before reporting information if CRA
has reason to question accuracy of original source).
249
Id.; WASH. REV. CODE §10.97.040 (2010). Exceptions to this completeness
requirement govern the disclosure of non-conviction criminal records for uses unrelated
to tenant-screening or other credit transactions.
250
Id.
251
Id. at § 10.97.080 (2010).
252
Id. at § 10.97.060 (1977).
253
Id. at § 10.97.050(1) (2005).
254
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (2010); see WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.040(1)(b) (2010).
255
See State v. C.R.H., 27 P.3d 660, 663 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (“[C]ourt may order a
criminal record sealed without express statutory authority”) (citing State v. Noel, 5 P.3d
747, 749 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)).
256
WASH. STAT. CT. G.R.15(c)(4) (“When the clerk receives an order to seal the entire
court file, the clerk shall seal the court file and secure it from public access.”). See also
WASH. STAT. CT. G.R.15(c)(5) (“When the clerk receives a court order to seal specified
court records the clerk shall . . . [r]emove the specified court records, seal them, and
return them to the file under seal or store separately. The clerk shall substitute a filler
sheet for the removed sealed court record.”).
257
See, e.g., In re Marriage of R.E., 183 P.3d 339, 344 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (family
court records may be sealed to protect mental health of children); Noel, 5 P.3d at 749–50
(criminal conviction records); C.R.H., 27 P.3d at 663 (juvenile records).
258
See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and
without unnecessary delay.”); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716, 720–
21 (Wash. 1982). Art. I, §10 protects public access to judicial records as well as live
proceedings. See Allied Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 848 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Wash. 1993);
State v. McEnry, 103 P.3d 857, 860 (Wash. 2004) (discussing sealing records of court
proceedings currently underway).
259
See Seattle Times Co., 640 P.2d at 720; see also WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”).
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260

See Indigo Real Estate Servs. v. Rousey, 215 P.3d 977, 981 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009);
see also McEnry, 103 P.3d at 860.
261
See WASH. STAT. CT. G.R.15(c).
262
Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.640(3) (2006) (“Once the court vacates a
record of conviction . . . the fact that the offender has been convicted of the offense shall
not be included in the offender's criminal history [and] the offender shall be released
from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense. For all purposes, including
responding to questions on employment applications, an offender whose conviction has
been vacated may state that the offender has never been convicted of that crime.”). See
State v. Waldon, 202 P.3d 325, 333 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (Art. I, § 7 provides authority
for court to seal records of vacated conviction to promote ex-offender’s employment, but
order must be narrowly tailored consistent with the state constitution, as interpreted by
Seattle Times Co., 640 P.2d 716). See also Noel, 5 P.3d at 749 (trial court erred by failing
to consider whether compelling circumstances justified an order sealing records of
misdemeanor convictions even absent statutory authority); WASH. REV. CODE §
36.23.065 (authorizing destruction of court records for archival purposes; information
must be retained elsewhere).
263
See Indigo Real Estate Servs., 215 P.3d at 982. See also McEnry, 103 P.3d at 860
(“McEnry conceded that potential loss of housing based on his court records was ‘not an
issue’ because he owns his home.”).
264
See Waldon, 202 P.3d at 330–31; Seattle Times Co., 640 P.2d at 720.
265
Indigo Real Estate Servs., 215 P.3d at 981.
266
See, e.g., White v. First Am. Registry, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1611(LAK), 2007 WL
703926, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007); Pultz v. Economakis, No. 114915/2004, 2005
WL 1845635, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2005).
267
See Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1188 (9th Cir. 2009)
(parents cleared of child abuse allegations have constitutional property interest in having
their names removed from Child Abuse Central Index); see also Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (public officials must afford constitutionally
adequate procedures before engaging in actions that stigmatize individuals); see also Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976) (due process rights are implicated where the
government inflicts a reputational injury that distinctly alters or extinguishes a right or
status previously recognized by state law).
268
See Federated Publ’ns, Inc., v. Kurtz, 615 P.2d 440, 446 (Wash. 1980); Seattle Times
Co., 640 P.2d at 719.
269
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 12.
270
See WASH. STAT. CT. G.R.15(b)(5) (“To redact means to protect from examination by
the public and unauthorized court personnel a portion or portions of a specified court
record.”).
271
See Allied Daily Newspapers of Washington v. Eikenberry, 848 P.2d 1258, 1261
(Wash. 1993) (“Openness of courts is essential to the courts' ability to maintain public
confidence in the fairness and honesty of the judicial branch of government as being the
ultimate protector of liberty, property, and constitutional integrity.”); see Dreiling v. Jain,
93 P.3d 861, 866–67 (Wash. 2004) (“access to judicial records, like the openness of court
proceedings, serves to enhance the basic fairness of the proceedings and to safeguard the
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integrity of the fact-finding process.”); see also Rufer v. Abbot Labs., 114 P.3d 1182,
1191 (Wash. 2005) (public has “very little, if any, interest” in court records that are not
relevant to the administration of justice).
272
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 40.
273
See Tami Bettendorf, Industry’s First Consumer-Initiated (Portable) TenantScreening Reports, EZINEARTICLES (Jan. 11, 2010), http://ezinearticles.com/?IndustrysFirst-Consumer---Initiated-%28Portable%29-Tenant-Screening-Reports&id=3559106.
274
See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.070 (2010) (“A consumer reporting agency shall,
upon request by the consumer, clearly and accurately disclose: (1) All information in the
file on the consumer at the time of request, except that medical information may be
withheld. . . . (2) All items of information in its files on that consumer, including
disclosure of the sources of the information, except that sources of information acquired
solely for use in an investigative report may only be disclosed to a plaintiff under
appropriate discovery procedures…). Whether it is an unfair practice for a screening
service not to compile and produce a report at the consumer’s request, when the
screening service would compile and produce a report at a landlord’s request, appears
possible, but has not yet been litigated. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2004)
(preempted by 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f) (1977) in In re Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225 (B.A.P 9th.
Cir. 2008).
275
See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 40.
276
See WMFHA Government Affairs 2009 Legislative Success Sheet, WASH.
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING ASS’N, at 1,
http://www.wmfha.org/associations/3138/files/LegislativeSummary2009.pdf (last visited
Oct. 16, 2010); see also Amy Maly, Leader in On-Line Leasing Welcomes Top Producer,
ON-SITE.COM (June 1, 2009), https://www.onsite.com/blog/jake_harrington/2009/05/leader_online_leasing_welcomes_top_sales_prod
ucer.
277
See Testimony of Brad Faulks to the Washington Senate Committee on Financial
Institutions, Housing & Insurance Regarding S.B. 5922, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
Feb. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2009021296&TYPE=V&CFID=2314
362&CFTOKEN=c76111f662eb78d6-4136E6A1-3048-349E4EAF7D290A0F36E8&bhcp=1. Brad Faulks is the Owner of Alliance 20–20, a tenantscreening company in Renton, Washington.
278
Moco, Inc., a screening service that markets a tenant-initiated screening product called
“myscreeningreport.com,” overcomes the specter of applicant-tampering by posting the
screening report to a secure website. The applicant is then given a web address and
password with which to access and view the report, which may be shared with housing
providers. However, the tenant has no ability to change the contents of the report that
appears on the website.
279
See Peter Zimmerman, Words from the front: a legislative report from Olympia,
SOLID GROUND BLOG (Mar. 4, 2010),
http://solidgroundblog.wordpress.com/2010/01/21/tenant-screening-a-housing-barrierfor-the-21st-century/ (“The tenant screening laws did not make it through the session, but
we got further this year than ever before. So, I am already thinking about next year!
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We’ve located a few chinks in the armor, and we are going to work on those. We actually
got farther than ever this year, pulling members of the House and the Senate out of
session to talk to them. We got a lot more dialogue going out of committee. Down the
road, I think we will achieve our goal of limiting tenant screening fees, removing this
barrier for folks looking for rentals. It might take two to three years, but I think it is
finally starting to sink in.”).
280
SB 5922, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 4, 7 (Wash. 2009); H.B. 2622, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess.
§§4, 7 (Wash. 2009).
281
SB 5922 § 4; HB 2622 §4.
282
See SB 5922 § 4(3)(b); HB 2622 §4(3)(b).
283
See SB 5922 §§ 3(1), 7(2); HB 2622 §§ 3(1), 7(2).
284
See, e.g., State v. McEnry, 103 P.3d 857, 859 (Wash. 2004) (“The statute says that
after vacation an offender may say he/she has never been convicted of this crime.
However, no provision is made to effectuate this statement by limiting access to the court
file. It is certainly possible that an employer or a landlord could review an unsealed court
file and see the record of a vacated conviction which might seem inconsistent with the
defendant's statement that no conviction existed.”).
285
SB 5922 §§ 3(1), 7(2), 8(2).
286
Id. at § 8(3); see also RCW 59.18.410 regarding reinstatement of a tenancy terminated
for non-payment of rent.
287
Id.
288
See WASH. STAT. CT. G.R.15(c).
289
CALI. CIV. CODE § 1161.2 (1991).
290
See Allied Daily Newspapers of Washington v. Eikenberry, 848 P.2d 1258, 1261
(Wash. 1993) (statute automatically prohibiting disclosure of victim’s names in child
sexual assault prosecutions unconstitutional because sealing requires individualized
determination on case-by-case basis).
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contract or other common law infraction. As this remains unclear and as remedies appear
limited, legislation specifically prohibiting arbitrary rejections of rental applications and
creating a meaningful remedy under the CPA, RLTA, or other statute, could significantly
enhance the rights of rental applicants facing unfair tenant-selection practices.
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